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HOPE FOR INDIAN TRIBES IN THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT?: MENOMINEE,
NEBRASKA V. PARKER, BRYANT,
DOLLAR GENERAL ... AND BEYOND
Bethany R. Berger*
There has long been concern that the U.S. Supreme Court is hos-
tile to Indian tribes. Between 1990 and 2015, tribal interests lost in
76.5% of Supreme Court cases distinctly affecting them; the loss rate
rose to 82% in the first decade of the Roberts Court. With four Indian
law cases on the docket last year, Native communities were poised for
disaster. Newspapers speculated on why tribes could not win in the
Supreme Court. By the end of June 2016, however, tribal interests had
lost just one case, won two, and the Court split four-four in a fourth,
affirming a lower court decision upholding tribal jurisdiction without
opinion.
One Term does not reverse a pattern of decades, and the Court
remains a very dangerous place for Indian tribes. But, together with
other recent majority and dissenting opinions, the Term suggests a
resurrection on the modern Court of an old idea: that tribes are a
third sovereign in the federal system and that this sovereignty has sig-
nificant implications for statutory construction, federal common law,
and even constitutional review. This shift is a product of a coordinat-
ed effort to familiarize justices with the modern reality of Native gov-
ernments and to highlight the connections between tribal status and
the law affecting other sovereigns. It reflects, as well, that the newer
members of the progressive wing come to the Court with more
knowledge of federal Indian law than the last.
Work remains to build a coherent theory of third sovereign sta-
tus on the Court. Given the voting records of the current justices,
moreover, Justice Neil Gorsuch may often be a deciding vote. Voting
in federal Indian law cases does not always accord with traditional
progressive-conservative divides, however, and Justice Gorsuch's
record suggests that he will be more open to tribal concerns than the
* Wallace Stevens Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Yale Law
School, B.A. Wesleyan University. Thanks to Gregory Ablavsky, Matthew Fletcher, Richard Guest,
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Tallchief Skibine, Michalyn Steele, and Joseph William Singer for helpful conunents and suggestions,
and to Patricia Murphy for excellent research assistance.
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late Justice Antonin Scalia. The President himself has a dark history
of levying false accusations and racial attacks against Indian tribes to
protect his own casino interests, and the early actions by his admin-
istration suggest hostility to tribal interests. But while the Supreme
Court is influenced by political tides, it is not the creature of them,
and Chief Justice Roberts appears committed to maintaining this. The
decisions of 2016, therefore, remain evidence that the decades-long
thumb on the scale against the third sovereign in the Supreme Court
may, occasionally, be lifted.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2015, supporters of the rights of tribes and Native peo-
ples were poised for catastrophe. The Roberts Court had been devastat-
ing for tribal nations. The Court had decided eleven Indian law cases,
and tribal interests had lost all but two, undermining longstanding prin-
ciples of state' and tribal jurisdiction, 2 federal authority to take land into
trust,3 and child custody.' The October 2015 Term' opened with three
Indian law cases on the Court's docket, and the Court soon granted cer-
tiorari in one more.' One of the cases, Menominee Indian Tribe v. United
1. Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
2. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008).
3. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).
4. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
5. That Term, beginning October 5, 2015 and ending October 2, 2016, will be abbreviated as
"the 2015 Term."
6. This Article does not discuss a fifth case that potentially impacts Indian tribes because it was
not framed as an Indian law case and did not reach the question that would most impact the rights of
tribal nations and Native peoples. Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061 (2016), held that nonfederally
[Vol. 20171902
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States,7 involved a statute of limitations question with generally little im-
pact on federal Indian law. But three others would have threatened the
governance powers of many tribes. Nebraska v. Parker concerned the
borders of tribal territory;' United States v. Bryant concerned the consti-
tutional status of tribal convictions;9 and Dollar General v. Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians concerned tribal court jurisdiction over non-
tribal citizens."o The Supreme Court had ruled consistently against tribes
in cases regarding jurisdiction over non-Indians since 1997,11 and consist-
ently against tribes in questions of tribal territory since 1993.12 The Tribal
Supreme Court Project coordinated feverish activity across the country
to present effective arguments in each case, 3 but privately, those in-
volved awaited the results with a sense of doom.
But at the end of June 2016, tribes and their supporters could
breathe a sigh of relief. Tribes lost in Menominee, but won in Nebraska v.
Parker and United States v. Bryant. In Dollar General, the Court split
four-four, affirming the Fifth Circuit's opinion in favor of jurisdiction
owned lands within federal conservation boundaries, under the Alaska National Interest Lands Con-
servation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3103 (2012) ("ANILCA"), are not subject to federal park service
regulations. Although the specific challenge concerned state-owned waters, ANICLA was written
against the backdrop of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (2012), and
much of the land reserved to Alaska Native groups under that act is within federal conservation
boundaries. See Brief on the Merits of Amici Curiae Doyon, Ltd. et al., Seeking Reversal at 1-2, Stur-
geon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061 (2016) (No. 14-1209). A number of Alaska Native corporations filed as
amici seeking reversal, arguing for more freedom to regulate land within those borders. Id. But federal
regulation of state-owned navigable waters within conservation boundaries permits federal protection
of Alaska Native subsistence fishing, and Alaska Natives have long fought to preserve that protection.
See John v. United States, 720 F.3d 1214, 1224 (9th Cir. 2013). Native subsistence users and two Alaska
Native villages filed in support of affirming federal jurisdiction. Brief for Alaska Native Subsistence
Users, as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Sturgeon, 136 S. Ct. 1061 (No. 14-1209). In the end,
the Supreme Court held that ANILCA did not permit federal regulation of the non-federal lands but
remanded for determination of whether some other ground might permit federal regulation of naviga-
ble waters within those lands. Sturgeon, 136 S. Ct. at 1072. Neither side, therefore, can claim a com-
plete victory.
7. 136 S. Ct. 750 (2016).
8. 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1076 (2016).
9. 792 F.3d 1042, 1042 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 690
(2016).
10. 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016), affg sub nom Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746
F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 2014).
11. See generally Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316
(2008); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); El
Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997);
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
12. See generally City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005); Alaska v.
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe,
522 U.S. 329 (1998); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1993). An additional two cases make it harder for
tribes to expand their Indian country by giving their land to the United States to take into trust.
Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209 (2012); Carcieri v.
Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).
13. I, for example, am not a frequent brief writer, but by the end of the year I had cowritten my
first Supreme Court amicus brief, Brief of Historical and Legal Scholars, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S.
Ct. 1072 (2016) (No. 14-1406), and provided assistance on another. Brief for Historians and Legal
Scholars Gregory Ablavsky et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Mis-
sissippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496).
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without opinion.1 4 A 66% win rate may not seem significant to those out-
side federal Indian law, but compared to the 76.5% loss rate over the
previous twenty-five years, it was a stunning reversal.
It is both too easy and unfair to blame this switch in time on the
death of Justice Scalia. From his remarks at oral argument" and his pre-
vious opinions," one can predict that his vote would have led to a ruling
against tribal jurisdiction in Dollar General. But his comments at oral ar-
gument in Nebraska v. Parker suggested contempt for the state's argu-
ment in that case,' 7 and respect for his memory may even have convinced
some Justices to join in the unanimous opinion for the tribe. 8 The other
decisions, one for and one against tribal interests, were also unanimous,
and little about Justice Scalia's history suggests that he would have ruled
differently.
This Article argues that the cases, when read together with various
dissents, concurrences, and rare majority opinions in recent years, sug-
gest a growing acceptance on the modem Court of an old idea: that tribes
remain a third sovereign under federal law 9 and that this sovereignty has
significant implications for statutory construction, the judicial role, and
even constitutional review. This shift is influenced by recent decisions re-
garding states and foreign nations, but also by federal Indian law deci-
sions that anteceded, and may even have contributed to, those decisions
regarding other sovereigns. Equally important, it reflects that the new
generation of the progressive wing comes to the Court with more
knowledge of tribal nations, and that concerted advocacy from Indian
country may be succeeding in familiarizing the Justices with the founda-
tional precedents and modem reality affecting Native people. This effort
is far from complete, and the Supreme Court remains a very dangerous
place for Native interests.2 0 But the current Term provides some reasons
14. 136 S. Ct. at 2160.
15. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 30:20-21, 50:6, 50:23-24, 53:4-14, Dollar Gen. Corp., 136
S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496).
16. The only opinion he authored in this field is Hicks, 533 U.S. at 370, which fabricated new
rules limiting tribal jurisdiction, but he also sought to limit tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians in all
the cases listed supra note 11, as well as in two additional cases involving tribal jurisdiction over non-
member Indians. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199 (2004); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688
(1990).
17. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5:9-13, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016) (No.14-
1406) (Scalia, J.). Other Justices were also skeptical. See, e.g., id. at 10:2-10 (Kagan, J.) ("You know,
because usually, at least now, we don't think much of subsequent history of any kind. Now, maybe
they thought a little bit more highly of it in the days when Solen was written, but now it would-it's - -
it's pretty much of a stretch to use subsequent legislative history or subsequent history generally when
we're dealing with a interpreting a statute.").
18. See infra Section III.B.
19. Interestingly, the term "third sovereign," I believe, came into currency due to an article by
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L.J.
1 (1997).
20. For example, Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017), the only federal Indian law opinion of
the 2016 Term, was a loss for tribal interests, holding that tribal employees did not share a tribe's sov-
ereign immunity. Even that decision, however, continued the trend I identify by considering tribal
common law immunity in the same framework as the common law immunity of other sovereigns.
1904 [Vol. 2017
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for hope that the decades-long thumb on the scales against Indian tribes
in the Supreme Court may, occasionally, be lifted.
Part II of this Article lays out the dismal recent history of federal
Indian law in the Supreme Court, complimented by an Appendix chart-
ing that history by subject matter, Chief Justice, and votes of individual
Justices, and discusses the reasons for this history and the efforts to ad-
dress it. Part III discusses the litigation and results in the four cases the
Supreme Court decided in 2016 and the ways they did and did not reflect
tribal status as third sovereigns. Part IV discusses the promise and limita-
tions of the 2015 Term, proposes a more cogent understanding of tribes
as third sovereigns in the federal system, and highlights the importance
of the next appointments to the Supreme Court in developing that un-
derstanding.
II. A DISMAL QUARTER CENTURY: FEDERAL INDIAN LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Over the quarter century beginning in 1990, tribal interests lost
more than three-quarters of the cases decided by the United States Su-
preme Court. This disparate win-loss rate begins with the certiorari pro-
cess, continued (and even worsened) in the Roberts Court, and affects
almost every subject distinctly impacting tribes. A Tribal Supreme Court
Project, founded in 2002, has ensured that Indian law cases receive coor-
dinated and high-quality advocacy in the Court, but the project has not
obviously improved success rates. This Part lays out the dismal history of
the last twenty-five years, discusses the causes of this history, and asserts
the importance of understanding the theory and reality of tribal sover-
eignty in changing this history.
A. The Losses
In 2001, the late Dean David Getches published a study charting the
success of tribal interests in the Supreme Court.21 Professor Getches
found that tribal interests won only 23% of Supreme Court decisions be-
tween 1986 (when William Rehnquist became Chief Justice) and 2000,
down from a 58% win rate between 1969 and 1986 (when Warren Burger
was Chief Justice).' This record was worse than that of any other group:
even convicted criminals, he found, had their sentences reversed 36% of
the time.23 The decisions, moreover, were not applications of existing
precedent, but rather often ignored precedent, creating new rules that
undermined tribal interests. 24
21. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Col-
or-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 267 (2001).
22. Id. at 280.
23. Id. at 281.
24. Id. at 273-74.
No. 5] 1905
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A subsequent study by Professor Matthew Fletcher showed that this
disparity begins with the certiorari process?.2 The Supreme Court has al-
most complete control over its docket, granting only about 4% of "paid"
petitions (those in which the petitioner is not in forma pauperis) a year. 26
But Professor Fletcher's comprehensive analysis of certiorari petitions
between 1987 and 1993 showed that the Supreme Court granted only one
out of ninety-three paid petitions filed by tribes or tribal interests,27 al-
most four times less than the average rate of success. In contrast, the
Court granted a whopping fourteen out of thirty-seven petitions filed by
states or local governments against tribal interests,2" almost ten times the
rate of success enjoyed by petitions generally. Nongovernmental peti-
tioners against tribal interests also did well, albeit by not quite as much.
Their petitions were granted four out of twenty-eight times,29 enjoying
roughly three times the success rate of all paid petitioners.
Professor Fletcher's examination of the memoranda and votes pro-
duced in the certiorari process illuminates the reasons for this disparity.
Decisions against tribal interests were seen as "factbound and splitless,"
meaning that they were fact dependent and did not create a split in lower
courts," and they were deemed unimportant outside the immediate dis-
pute."' Petitions seeking review of decisions favoring tribal interests, in
contrast, were seen as having high "national importance," even when
they were similarly dependent on facts and consistent with other rul-
ings.3 2 In short, non-Indian appeals of decisions that hurt them were im-
portant to everyone, while tribal appeals of decisions that hurt them were
not.
I have updated Professor Getches's research to reflect cases decided
in the twenty-five years between 1990 and 2015. The full list of cases is
printed as Appendix A at the end of this Article, but here are the high-
lights. Out of forty-nine federal Indian law cases 33 resulting in a full opin-
25. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as Barrier to Justice
for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REv. 933, 938-39 (2009).
26. David 0. Stewart, Quiet Times: The Supreme Court is Reducing its Workload-But Why?, 80
A.B.A. J. 40, 40 (1994) (noting 3.7% success rate in 1993 term and that willingness to grant petitions
had declined); Kedar S. Bhatia, Likelihood of a Petition Being Granted, DAILYWRIT (Jan. 10, 2013),
http://dailywrit.com/2013/01/likelihood-of-a-petition-being-granted/ (calculating 4.29% rate of success
between 2001 and 2011). The rate of success for in forma pauperis petitions, which are largely filed by
prisoners, is far worse. Id.
27. Fletcher, supra note 25, at 935.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 937.
31. Id. at 973-75.
32. Id. at 968. In a particularly glaring discrepancy, in one long-running set of disputes between
the Oklahoma Tax Commission and Oklahoma tribes, the clerks described petitions by the Commis-
sion as raising "important concerns of federalism," while petitions filed by Indian tribes were "of no
general significance." Id. at 973. At times, moreover, the Justices voted to grant certiorari even when
the clerk's certiorari memo recommended against it. Id. at 972.
33. To construct this list, I first searched all cases using the West keyword topic "Indian," and
excluded cases like United States v. Bormes, 133 S. Ct. 12 (2012), which discusses the Indian Tucker
Act but not in the context of a dispute involving Indians. I then did a broader search for cases using
the words "Indians" and" tribes" and added a handful of additional cases that distinctively affected
[Vol. 20171906
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ion, tribal interests won only 11.5 and lost 37.5.4 In other words, they
won 23.5% and lost 76.5% of these cases, almost exactly what Professor
Getches found fifteen years ago. What is more, the disparity across the
first decade of the Roberts Court, with an 18% win rate, was even worse
than the 29% win rate over the nineteen years of the Rehnquist Court.35
tribes or Native peoples as members of indigenous political communities. See Inyo County, Ca. v. Pai-
ute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty., 538 U.S. 701 (2003) (holding that tribes are not "persons"
who can sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (discussing constitutionali-
ty of a voting rights scheme affecting Native Hawaiians, an indigenous group whose status is related
but different from federal Indian tribes, under the rubric of measures affecting recognized Indian
tribes); Dep't of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1 (2001) (holding that
there was no Indian trust exception to FOIA); Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392 (2000) (holding that
tribal claims for additional water based on resolution of reservation boundary dispute were not pre-
cluded by previous settlement of water rights claims involving states and tribes); Amoco Prod. Co. v.
S. Ute Indiana Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999) (holding surface estate holders, and not tribes holding equi-
table title to coal on reservation, owned gas from coal); Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 523 U.S.
696 (1998) (holding tribe was not entitled to disgorgement of state severance taxes collected from tribe
in violation of Indian Mineral Leasing Act); Idaho v. Coueur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261
(1997) (holding that the Coueur D'Alene could not maintain an action claiming that it, and not the
state, owned the submerged lands on its reservation because the suit was the functional equivalent of a
quiet title suit and barred by tribal sovereign immunity); Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S.
775 (1991) (holding that that, unlike other states, tribes are barred from suing states by sovereign im-
munity). The figures do not include cases that turned up in that broader search but do not distinctively
affect tribal claims, such as South Florida Water Management District v. Mikosukee Tribe of Indians,
541 U.S. 95 (2004), which reversed a judgment in favor of the tribe challenging alleged Clean Water
Act violations, or cases in which the Court simply vacated and remanded the judgment below, such as
Oklahoma v. Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 1129 (1996).
34. The .5s reflect the results in three cases, Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation,
515 U.S. 450 (1995), County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,
502 U.S. 251 (1992), and Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Ok-
lahoma, 498 U.S. 505 (1991), in which tribal interests won and lost important issues in the same case.
35. As Congress and the executive branch have actually increased support for tribal self-
determination over this period, this trend supports Erwin Chemerinsky's thesis that the conservative
activists of the Roberts Court have discarded the deference that previous conservatives showed to
elective branches. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court-October Term 2009 Foreword: Conserva-
tive Judicial Activism, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 863 (2011).
No. 5] 1907
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Finally, although the numbers are too small to permit emphasis on
the results in any one subject area, the disparate win-loss rates persist
across all major subject areas other than tribal sovereign immunity.
FIGURE 2: WINs/LOSSES BY SUBJECT MATTER (1990-2015)
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In short, over the last quarter century, tribes have been far more
likely to lose in the Supreme Court than they have been to win. This dis-
parity begins at the certiorari process and persists across Chief Justice
and subject matter. As seen in the next Section, it has, until recently, also
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resisted tremendous coordinated advocacy from lawyers and tribal lead-
ers from across the country.
B. The Tribal Supreme Court Project
In 2002, in response to the dismal record on the Court, the Native
American Rights Fund and the National Congress of American Indians
("NCAI") joined forces to create the Tribal Supreme Court Project
("Project"). 6 The Project built a Supreme Court project working group
of hundreds of attorneys and academics to share legal information and
experience," as well as an advisory board of tribal leaders to ensure that
representation reflected the tribal perspective." When certiorari is grant-
ed, the Project works to ensure litigants are advised or represented by
expert Supreme Court counsel. 9 The Project also tries to coordinate
amicus briefs "to submit to the Court the fewest number and the highest
quality briefs in support of the Indian argument.""
The Project had initial success in preventing further incursions into
existing precedent. 4 1 In 2004, it also contributed to a significant victory in
United States v. Lara.4 2 In 1990, in Duro v. Reina, the Supreme Court held
that tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over Indians who were not mem-
bers of the governing tribe.43 Congress reacted with the "Duro Fix,"
which "affirmed the inherent power of Indian tribes ... to exercise crim-
inal jurisdiction over all Indians."" Lara held Congress could constitu-
tionally enact the statute.45
Lara turned, in part, on the scope of congressional "plenary power"
in Indian affairs, which the Court had previously described as the result
of tribal "weakness and helplessness,"4 as an "uneducated, helpless and
dependent people."4 7 The amicus briefs, however, presented congres-
sional power through the lens of tribal sovereignty. Just as Congress
could adjust the powers of states or colonized territories, the NCAI brief
declared, "[i]t is precisely because a Tribe is a sovereign governmental
authority that Congress may authorize the Tribe qua sovereign to exer-
36. See Tracy Labin, We Stand United Before the Court: The Tribal Supreme Court Project, 37
NEW ENG. L. REV. 695, 696 (2003).
37. Id. at 697.
38. Id. at 698.
39. Id. at 698-99.
40. Id.
41. See Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA L. REV.
5, 18-20 (2004) (discussing decisions between 2002 and 2004).
42. 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (upholding the "Duro Fix," which affirmed inherent criminal jurisdiction
over Indians who were not citizens of the tribe asserting jurisdiction).
43. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
44. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012).
45. Lara, 541 U.S. at 196.
46. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) ("From their very weakness and help-
lessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the treaties
in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.").
47. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974) (quoting Bd. of Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705,
715 (1943)).
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cise sovereign powers, rather than to act as a federal agency."4 A brief
on behalf of eighteen tribes, meanwhile, highlighted the need for the Du-
ro Fix by presenting the lived reality of tribal nations trying to police and
ensure public safety in their communities. 49
These briefs appeared to influence not just the narrow 5-4 win but
also the language of the majority opinion.w Justice Breyer's opinion re-
called that, for decades after the Founding, federal Indian policy was
"more an aspect of military and foreign policy than a subject of domestic
or municipal law,"" and described the statute as, like statutes ending the
colonization of the Philippines or increasing the self-governance powers
of Puerto Rico, modifying "the degree of autonomy enjoyed by a de-
pendent sovereign that is not a State . . . ."5 2 Moreover, by expanding the
"tribe's authority to control events that occur upon the tribe's own land,"
the statute was not a radical change but was "consistent with our tradi-
tional understanding of the tribes' status as 'domestic dependent na-
tions.""'
Once Chief Justice John Roberts came to the Court, however,
hopes for rebalancing the scales ended. With just two wins out of eleven
decided cases between the 2005 and 2014 Terms (and none before the
2011 Term), the 18% win rate was even lower than that on the Rehnquist
Court. The 2012 win in Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter,' moreover,
had little to do with tribal sovereignty, but instead it concerned whether
the United States had to actually pay the amounts promised tribal con-
tractors" and largely reaffirmed a 2005 decision on the same contracts.5 1
The 2014 win in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community7 was
more significant. The case should have been an easy one for the Court.
The question was whether tribal sovereign immunity applied to a tribe's
commercial activities outside its reservation. In 1998, the Court squarely
held that it did in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technolo-
gies, Inc." Although the Kiowa majority declared "there are reasons to
doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine" of sovereign immunity,
it held that this was a question for Congress.5 9 Congress had not acted;
instead, it had considered and not passed several bills that would have
48. Brief for National Congress of American Indians as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 3, Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (No. 03-107). For further discussion of the briefs and work of the project in
Lara, see Berger, supra note 40, at 20-22.
49. Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of Eighteen American Indian Tribes at 22-29, Lara, 541 U.S.
193 (2004) (No. 03-107) .
50. See Berger, supra note 41, at 22.
51. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004).
52. Id. at 204.
53. Id.
54. 567 U.S. 182 (2012).
55. Id.
56. Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005).
57. 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014).
58. 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998).
59. Id. at 758.
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modified tribal immunity.' But the facts were terrible for the tribal per-
spective: the case involved a state's challenge to a tribe's action in build-
ing a casino outside its established reservation. Nevertheless, armed with
congressional history and six modern cases affirming tribal sovereign
immunity,"5 the Bay Mills Indian Community managed to eke out a 5-4
victory.
More important than the holding was the language of Justice Ka-
gan's opinion for the majority. The opinion began by emphasizing that
"Indian tribes are 'domestic dependent nations"' with "inherent sover-
eign authority,' ... 'separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution,'"
and "unless and 'until Congress acts, the tribes retain' their historic sov-
ereign authority."6 2 Tribal sovereign immunity was a necessary corollary
to this sovereignty, and "unequivocal" language of Congress was needed
to abrogate it.63 "That rule of construction," the Bay Mills's Court de-
clared, "reflects an enduring principle of Indian law: Although Congress
has plenary authority over tribes, courts will not lightly assume that Con-
gress in fact intends to undermine Indian self-government."" Although
these principles were established by much older cases, the opinion was
the Court's most full-throated endorsement of tribal sovereignty in a
generation.
Again, Bay Mills rested on recent precedent that was squarely on
point. If it could gamer only a bare majority on the Court, the decision
confirmed that the Court remained a dangerous place for Indians.
C. The Reasons
Why is the tribal record on the Supreme Court so abysmal? Some of
it is related to the conservative shift of the Court generally over this pe-
riod. Some of it may be due to disparities in the extent to which the Jus-
tices understand and care about tribal and Native concerns. But neither
factor fully covers the depth of the disparity or explains why the more
liberal members of the Court, including Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, and
Souter, or Justice Kennedy, the famous swing voter, not only joined, but
at times led, the charge against tribal interests. In this Section, I argue
that these losses reflect an inability to see tribal interests as sovereign in-
terests or to understand what tribal sovereignty means to Native people
and others. Without this understanding of theory and the modern reality
of tribes as third sovereigns, both past precedent and existing claims are
incoherent and potentially unjust.
60. Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2038-39.
61. C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe , 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001);
Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760; Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,
509 (1991); Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877,
890-91 (1986); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of
Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1977).
62. Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2030 (internal citations omitted).
63. Id. at 2031.
64. Id. at 2031-32.
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The record streak of tribal losses is related to the Court's shift to the
right. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, for example, was tremendously
influential in both the Court's conservative"5 and anti-tribal shift. He
practiced and was active in politics in Arizona during that state's Su-
preme Court battles with Indian tribes," and, in the 1970s, he wrote the
decisions that laid the groundwork for decades of tribal losses.17 Justice
Thurgood Marshall, meanwhile, was both one of the most liberal mem-
bers of the Court and one of its strongest advocates for tribal sovereign-
ty, while his replacement, Justice Clarence Thomas, is one of the most
conservative Justices and, until 2016, had a near-perfect record of voting
and writing opinions against tribal interests. Similarly, in 2006, Justice
O'Connor, a moderate who had become a relatively sympathetic voice
for tribal interests, was replaced with Justice Alito, both an ultra-
conservative and a frequent writer against tribal interests. There is,
therefore, some support for Dean David H. Getches's thesis that tribal
issues lose in the Supreme Court because they bring together three bug-
bears of the conservative wing: intruding on state rights, protecting "spe-
cial rights" of minorities and other groups, and undermining majoritarian
values and expectations."
But his thesis does not explain why, until recently, the more liberal
justices on the current Court have frequently voted to undermine tribal
interests as well. Justice Ginsburg is more liberal than her predecessor
Justice White, but until recently, her record in Indian law cases was far
worse than his.69 Justice Kennedy is a swing voter in many areas but in
federal Indian law has a record of voting and writing against tribal inter-
ests that rivals that of Justice Thomas.70 Justice Souter, while often voting
in favor of respecting contracts and treaties with Indian tribes, also re-
65. Jeffrey Rosen, Rehnquist the Great?, ATLANTIC (April 2005), https://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2005/04/rehnquist-the-great/303820/.
66. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); Williams v.
Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Rosen, supra note 65 (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquiest was "active in
local Republican circles" following his move to Phoenix in 1953).
67. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that tribes lacked
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians committing crimes on their reservations); Moe v. Con-
federated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976) (holding the
state could tax cigarettes sold by tribal members to non-Indians on their reservations).
68. Getches, supra note 21, at 268-69.
69. Justice White wrote some very bad opinions for tribal interests but also some very good ones.
Compare Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980)
(holding Washington could tax cigarettes purchased on reservations by nontribe members and that
Washington assumed civil and criminal jurisdiction over the Reservations), with California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (holding that California did not have jurisdiction to regu-
late the reservation's bingo enterprise), and Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y. State v. Oneida Cty., New
York, 414 U.S. 661 (1974) (holding that Indian title is a matter of federal law and can only be extin-
guished with federal consent). On Justice Ginsburg's record, see Carole Goldberg, Finding the Way to
Indian Country: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's Decisions in Indian Law Cases, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1003,
1013-18 (2009).
70. See infra Appendix A.
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peatedly pushed the Court to go even further in stripping tribes of juris-
diction.' Something beyond a liberal-conservative bias is going on here.
Part of the issue is lack of familiarity. Justice Powell's belief that he
did not know any homosexuals (although one of his own law clerks was
gay) is cited in explaining his vote upholding criminalizing sodomy, and
the far greater presence of out-gay individuals in elite law circles today
may be part of the story behind the Court's recent reversal on LGBT
rights.7 2 Native people affiliated with their tribes, in contrast, make up
less than 1% of the population, and most justices and their clerks come
to the Court with little experience of them or of federal Indian law. For
them, the concept of tribes as living communities acting in the modem
world is not just foreign but bizarre. Richard Guest, who directs the
Tribal Supreme Court Project for the NARF, aptly describes the oral ar-
gument in a 2008 tribal jurisdiction case as a "preview of the struggle by
many justices ... to get their minds around the concept that Indian tribes
as governments could have authority over non-Indians . . ." Professor
Fletcher's study of the certiorari process also supports the importance of
familiarity, suggesting that both the Justices and their clerks found it eas-
ier to generalize from and empathize with the experience of non-Indians
and their governments than Native people and their governments.7 4 But
Supreme Court Justices frequently rule in favor of groups they do not
know, so this cannot be the whole story either.
More important is that, for a group of progressive-to-moderate Jus-
tices, tribal claims looked not just unfamiliar, but unfair. In particular,
tribal governments are not bound by the Constitution," many of their ac-
tions are not reviewable in federal court,7 6 and they generally accord citi-
zenship by descent rather than residence. While antipathy to intrusions
on state interests and protection of group rights might explain the anti-
tribal opinions of those like Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito, concern for preventing potential unfairness does more to explain
those of Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Stevens.7 1
71. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 231 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting); Nevada v. Hicks,
533 U.S. 353, 375 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring); Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645,659-60 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring).
72. See Adam Liptak, Exhibit A for a Major Shift: Justices' Gay Clerks, N.Y. TIMES (June 8,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/us/exhibit-a-for-a-major-shift-justices-gay-clerks.html.
73. Richard A. Guest, Motherhood and Apple Pie: Judicial Termination and the Roberts Court,
56-APR FED. LAw. 52, 57 (2009).
74. See generally Fletcher, supra note 25 (arguing that the Supreme Court's certiorari decisions
tend to prejudice tribal interests).
75. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
76. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18-19 (1987) (holidog that diversity jurisdiction
did not permit removal from tribal court and that, although a federal court could review a question of
tribal court jurisdiction to hear a case involving non-Indians, unless jurisdiction was lacking, the case
could not be relitigated there); Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 64-65 (holding that federal review for
violations of the Indian Civil Rights Act was limited to habeas actions).
77. See Bethany R. Berger, Race, Descent, and Tribal Citizenship, 4 CALtF. L. REV. CIR. 23, 28
(2013) (discussing tribal citizenship requirements).
78. See Bethany R. Berger, Liberalism and Republicanism in Federal Indian Law, 38 CONN. L.
REv. 813, 814-17 (2005-2006) (discussing Justices' opinions regarding tribal interests). These argu-
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If that is true, why did more reliably progressive Justices-Justices
Thurgood Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, Black, and Warren-vote fairly
consistently for tribal sovereign interests? The difference lies not in lib-
eralism but in perspective. The previous generation of progressive Justic-
es more consistently saw tribes as colonized governments working to
govern themselves and their territory.79 If tribal nations are seen as sepa-
rate governments, then most of the apparent sources of unfairness seem
unexceptional. For example, as "separate sovereigns pre-existing the
Constitution," it seems obvious why tribes are not constrained by consti-
tutional provisions they neither framed nor agreed to.80 Similarly, once
reservations are understood as separate sovereign territories, it seems
clear that state laws should not apply to tribal citizens or undermine trib-
al authority on reservations absent clear evidence of congressional in-
tent." Moreover, if one combines this understanding of tribes as third
sovereigns with a recognition of the injustice of their colonization, re-
specting tribal sovereign rights seems to be not just common sense but a
progressive mandate.
Understanding tribes as colonized but still existing sovereigns is not
just a matter of perspective but of precedent. The original federal Indian
policy dealt with Indian tribes largely through the law of nations, rather
than as a matter of domestic policy.8 2 The foundational Supreme Court
opinions reflected this policy, turning to tribes' original independent sov-
ereign status to determine tribal, federal, and state authority." It is true
ments are also touted by the more conservative Justices. See id.; Guest, supra note 73, at 57-58 (dis-
cussing questions asked by Justices Roberts and Scalia at oral argument in Plains Commerce Bank v.
Long Family Land & Cattle Co.). But the fact that Justices who more consistently rule in favor of fair-
ness in other contexts also rule in favor of tribes suggests that something beyond an abiding commit-
ment to justice is at work.
79. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59 (showing Justice Marshall holding that federal
causes of action under the Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA") were limited to habeas suits because cre-
ating "a federal forum ... constitutes an interference with tribal autonomy and self-government be-
yond that created by the change in substantive law itself"); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)
(showing Justice Black rejecting state jurisdiction over a collection dispute between a Navajo couple
and a non-Indian trader because it would "undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reserva-
tion affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves").
80. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56.
81. See Bryan v. Itasca Cty., Minn., 426 U.S. 373, 381 (1976).
82. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 ("'[Tlhe first century of America's national existence
... Indian affairs were more an aspect of military and foreign policy than a subject of domestic or mu-
nicipal law."') (quoting F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 208 (1982 ed.); Gregory Ablavsky,
Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1059 (2014-2015) (stating that the founders
"drew on the law of nations to determine Native status," framing "nearly all issues of Indian affairs,
including the question of land title, through the international law concept of sovereignty"); Nell Jessup
Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 200
(1983-1984) ("[T]he same powers that sufficed to give the federal government a free rein in the inter-
national arena were viewed as sufficient to enable the new government to deal adequately with the
Indian tribes.").
83. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383-84 (1896) (internal citations omitted) (relying on
the original status of Indian tribes as "distinct, independent political communities" to find that "as the
powers of local self-government enjoyed by the Cherokee Nation existed prior to the Constitution,
they are not operated upon by the fifth amendment"); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 542-43
(1832) (Declaring that "America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct
people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest of the world, having
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that these precedents recognized (and sometimes applauded) the reality
of colonialism and bowed to the deliberate actions of Congress in for-
warding the colonial project." But where Congress had not acted clearly
or where the United States had not yet plainly broken its promises, the
Court generally ruled that those promises and tribal rights remained."
The Tribal Supreme Court Project has sought to familiarize the Jus-
tices with the third sovereign perspective on federal Indian law and its
very real impact on Native communities. The Project has supported legal
arguments that link recognition of tribal sovereignty to more familiar
doctrines regarding other sovereigns. Briefs from tribal communities,
meanwhile, present the lived reality of Indian communities struggling
with poverty, violence, dislocation, and byzantine jurisdictional limita-
tions, but nevertheless governing and developing functioning legal insti-
tutions. In addition, wherever possible, those working with the Project
seek amicus briefs from parties that elicit more automatic sympathy from
the Court -particularly states-in support of their claims.,,
While this advocacy did not appreciably change the success rate in
the Roberts Court, it may have contributed to the fact that many of the
post-2002 losses were split opinions," a contrast with the 9-0 losses of the
previous decade." The Project also appears to have succeeded in its ef-
forts to limit the number of cases for which certiorari is granted. The
Rehnquist Court decided an average of 2.5 Indian law cases a year,"s a
whopping number for a body of law affecting relatively few people. This
figure dropped by almost half to 1.1 during the Roberts Court."
The appointments of Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan in
2009 and 2010 also added Justices already familiar with alternative forms
of sovereignty to the Court. Justice Sotomayor's knowledge of Puerto
Rico's struggles with dependent sovereignty likely contributes to her
institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their own laws," before finding state could not
operate against a non-Indian in Cherokee territory).
84. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (refusing to review whether a congres-
sional acquisition of tribal land violated federal treaties with the tribes).
85. For the fullest discussion of this balance, see Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present:
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381
(1993).
86. See, e.g., Brief for the States of Mississippi et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496);
Brief for the States of Arizona et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 16, Adoptive Couple
v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12-399); Brief for the States of Washington et al., as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (No. 03-107).
87. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 342 (2008)
(Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, Souter, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting); Wagnon v. Prairie Band Pota-
watomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 115 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., joined by Kennedy, J., dissenting); City of Sher-
rill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197,222 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); Alaska v. Native Vill. of Ve-
netie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
89. In the nineteen years between September 1986 and September 2005, the Rehnquist Court
decided forty-eight cases.
90. Richard Guest, Tribal Supreme Court Project Ten Year Report: Oct. Term 2001-Oct. Term
2010, 1 AM. INDIAN L.J. 28, 30 (2012).
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sympathy for tribal claims.' As Dean of Harvard Law School, Justice
Kagan helped administer the Oneida Indian Nation Chair in Federal In-
dian Law, which has for many years brought federal Indian law scholars
to Harvard Law School and would have given her a degree of familiarity
with the subject." In addition, Justice Stephen Breyer's post-appointment
work on the importance of the Cherokee Cases in the history of judicial
review9' gave him knowledge and admiration for the foundational prece-
dents in federal Indian law.
Despite these changes, and over a decade of work by the Tribal Su-
preme Project, the reconfigured Court barely voted to uphold well-
established precedent on tribal sovereign immunity in Bay Mills." The
Project succeeded in keeping federal Indian law cases out of the Su-
preme Court in the 2014 term. In 2015, however, tribes did not get so
lucky.
III. THE CASES
The October 2015 Term began with three federal Indian law cases
on the Supreme Court docket: Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v.
United States,9' Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw In-
dians," and Nebraska v. Parker." The Court granted certiorari in a
fourth, United States v. Bryant," in December. 9 Unlike in Bay Mills,
there was no controlling precedent in any of these cases. Three involved
issues at the heart of tribal sovereignty: tribal territory, tribal jurisdiction,
and the constitutionality of federal actions furthering tribal self-
governance. Two arose from fact patterns that have consistently lost in
the modern Court: tribal interference with the interests of non-Indian
governments and businesses.
By the time the Term ended, the tribes had lost only the case with
the least impact on federal Indian law, won the territorial and constitu-
tional cases, and the Court split four-four on the tribal jurisdiction case,
upholding the result below without opinion. This surprising result does
91. Although New York born and bred, Justice Sotomayor's parents were born in Puerto Rico,
and her undergraduate thesis at Princeton and Yale Law Journal note both concerned Puerto Rican
sovereignty. See generally Sonia Sotomayor de Noonan, Note, Statehood and the Equal Footing Doc-
trine: The Case for Puerto Rican Seabed Rights, 88 YALE L.J. 825 (1979).
92. Rob Capriccioso, Harvard Officials Defend Kagan on Indian Issues, INDIAN COUNTRY
MIEDIA NETWORK (June 25, 2010), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.comlnews/harvard-officials-
defend-kagan-on-indian-issues/.
93. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE'S VIEW 1-2 (2010)
(comparing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832)); Stephen Breyer, For Their Own Good, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 3, 2008), https://newrepublic.
com/article/63490/their-own-good.
94. 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014).
95. 136 S. Ct. 750 (2016).
96. 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
97. 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016). The Court granted certiorari in Parker just before the Term began, on
October 1, 2015. 136 S. Ct. 27 (2015).
98. 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016).
99. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 690 (2015).
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not reflect a general sympathy for alternative forms of sovereignty: a case
asserting the inherent sovereignty of Puerto Rico lost seven-two because
precedent went against the claim." Rather, it reflects that the Court, at
least in some cases, was both ready to accept existing precedent estab-
lishing tribal third sovereign status and willing to apply that precedent to
acknowledge the modern existence of Indian tribes. This Part discusses
the four cases in the order in which they were decided and examines
what they mean for the third sovereign in the federal system.
A. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States
Menomineeo' arose from an Indian law context and concerned a
long-standing dispute between the United States and many tribes. It had
little effect, however, on the distinct status of tribal nations or Native
peoples and turned almost wholly on doctrines outside federal Indian
law.
The case concerned funding under the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act ("ISDA")."0 The law, enacted in 1975, al-
lows tribes to take over administration of federal programs providing
health, education, police, and other services for Native people in Indian
country." Since its passage, tribes have taken over administration of
governmental services for hundreds of thousands of Native people on
reservations and tribal and Alaska Native territories throughout the
country.104
The ISDA directs that federal funding of tribal self-determination
programs "shall not be less" than it would have been had the United
States operated the program."as Initially, however, the United States re-
fused to fund indirect costs such as auditing, accounting, legal services,
and human resources.1" In 1988, Congress amended the ISDA to require
100. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016). Sanchez Valle concerned whether the
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited Puerto Rico from prosecuting an illegal gun sale after the defend-
ants had pled guilty in federal court to an offense arising from the same actions. If the prosecutions
had involved the federal government and either a state or a tribal nation, the answer would clearly
have been no because the prosecutions stemmed from different sources of sovereignty. See United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978). The majority, in an opinion by Justice Kagan, held that
because Puerto Rico's sovereignty as a territory derived from Congress, the prosecution violated the
double jeopardy prohibition. The Court has previously held as much in an earlier case. Puerto Rico v.
Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 261 (1937). A dissent by Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Sotomayor, argued
that Congress' actions in turning self-government over to Puerto Rico made it a separate sovereign for
double jeopardy purposes. The dissent argued that the sovereignty of many entities deemed non-
federal for Double Jeopardy purposes-including states other than the original thirteen, the Philip-
pines, and tribal nations-was tainted by congressional action as well. Therefore, the dissenters assert-
ed, for Puerto Rico "as with the Philippines, new States, and the Indian tribes-congressional activity
and other historic circumstances can combine to establish a new source of power." 136 S. Ct. at 1880
(Breyer, J., joined by Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
101. 136 S. Ct. 750 (2016).
102. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-58 (2012).
103. Id.
104. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw § 22.02 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012).
105. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(a)(1) (2012).
106. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 104, § 22.02[5].
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funding of such "contract support costs" necessary to administer a self-
determination contract.'07 Today, tribes and the federal government ne-
gotiate contract support costs in their annual self-determination contract
funding agreements.'"
The United States has consistently failed to fully pay for the agreed
contract support costs,"' resulting in decades of tribal litigation."0 Alt-
hough this litigation had mixed results in the lower courts, it resulted in
two of the rare recent tribal victories in the Supreme Court. In 2005, in
Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt,"' the Supreme Court unanimously held that
failure to earmark sufficient funds in annual appropriation acts did not
relieve the government of its obligation to fulfill its contracts, so long as
sufficient unrestricted funds were allocated to the agency.11 2 Cherokee
Nation did not decide on the effect of language that Congress had begun
inserting in its appropriations acts stating that funding for contract sup-
port costs was "not to exceed" the amount appropriated."' In 2012, Sala-
zar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter held that the United States could not so
easily avoid its contractual obligations."4
Shortly after the Cherokee Nation decision, a number of tribes, in-
cluding Menominee, filed claims seeking compensation with the Indian
Health Service ("IHS")." The IHS rejected Menominee's 1996 to 1998
claims because it had not formally presented them to the IHS within six
years,1' 6 as required by the Contract Disputes Act."7 Menominee claimed
that formally presenting the claims was excused both by its participation
since the 1990s in two class action suits challenging underpayment of
contract support costs, and by the trust responsibility of the United
States to Indian tribes."' In previewing the case for SCOTUSblog,
Ronald Mann opined that:
107. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(a)(2).
108. Id. at § 450j-1(a)(3)(B).
109. Brief for Petitioner at 2, 18-27, Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
750 (2016) (No. 14-510).
110. This litigation is summarized in COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note
104, § 22.02[5].
111. 543 U.S. 631 (2005).
112. Id. at 637-38, 641.
113. Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar, 644 F.3d 1054, 1059 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that the
United States remained obligated to pay despite "not to exceed" language). But see Arctic Slope Na-
tive Ass'n v. Sebelius, 629 F.3d 1296, 1301-04 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding language relieved government
of obligation to pay beyond the specific obligation).
114. Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 567 U.S. 182, 193-95 (2012).
115. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750, 754 (2016); Brief for Peti-
tioner at 4, Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750 (2016) (No. 14-510).
116. Menominee, 136 S. Ct. at 754.
117. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(a) (2012).
118. Brief for Petitioner at 18-27, Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750
(2016) (No. 14-510). Menominee first participated in a class action filed against the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. Menominee, 136 S. Ct. at 755 (referencing Complaint, Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Lujan, No.
1:90-cv-0957 (D.N.M. Oct.4, 1990)). That class was certified over objections by the United States that
some plaintiffs had not formally filed their claims with the BIA. Id. at 754 (referencing Memorandum
Opinion, Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Lujan, No. 1:90-cv-0957 (D.N.M. Oct 1, 1993)). It was also part of
a putative class action filed against the Indian Health Service in Id. (referencing Ramah Navajo Chap-
ter v. Lujan, No. 1:90-cv-0957 (D.N.M., Oct. 1, 1993)), but that class was denied certification on com-
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If ever a case called for pure and unfiltered judgments about fair-
ness, it is Menominee Indian Tribe v. United States .... From the
tribe's perspective, the government promised to pay this money, but
then thought better of it and interposed innumerable objections to
the payments, requiring protracted litigation in multiple class and
individual actions, with the government eventually losing pretty
much all of the litigation.119
After hearing the Justices' "unremittingly dubious" questions for
the tribe at oral arguments, however, Professor Mann called Menominee
an instance "when my initial take on a case is most strikingly mistak-
en."12 0 In an opinion by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court unanimously
rejected the tribe's petition.121 The trust responsibility, the Court held,
did not void the requirements of a specific statutory exhaustion obliga-
tion.12  Although the Supreme Court has long held that "commencement
of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all as-
serted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit
been permitted to continue as a class action,"1 23 the Court held that with-
out having first filed a claim with the agency, Menominee could never
have properly been a member of the class.124 The tribe's reliance on the
certification of one of these class actions, the Court held, was a simple
mistake of law, not the kind of "extraordinary circumstance" necessary
to trigger equitable tolling.1 25
While a loss for the tribe, the case has little general impact on tribal
interests. The argument that the trust responsibility gives rise to broader
equitable tolling was accepted by the Federal Circuit in another ISDA
case,1 26 but otherwise has little support in the case law. Because the delay
was not caused by the federal government, it seems unrelated to other
contested trust claims.1 27 The holding that a member of a putative class
cannot be part of a class without having first asserted its administrative
monality and typicality grounds. Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States, 199 F.R.D. 357, 363-66
(E.D. Okla. 2001). It was not until after the Menominee Tribe had filed its claims that a court held that
tribes had to formally present their claims to the agency before being part of a class. Pueblo of Zuni v.
United States, 243 F.R.D. 436,452 (D. N.M. 2007).
119. Ronald Mann, Argument Preview: Justices Return to Dispute About Government's Refusal to
Comply with Contracts to Support Tribes, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 24, 2015, 3:57 PM), http://www.scotus
blog.com/2015/11/argument-preview-justices-return-to-dispute-about-governments-refusal-to-comply-
with-contracts-to-support-tribes/.
120. Ronald Mann, Argument Analysis: Justices Dubious of Tribe's Claim for Equitable Tolling in
Government Contract Dispute, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 2, 2015, 11:12 AM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2015/12/argument-analysis-justices-dubious-of-tribes-claim-for-equitable-tolling-in-governent-
contract-disputel.
121. Menominee, 136 S. Ct. at 757.
122. Id.
123. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974).
124. Menominee, 136 S. Ct. at 756.
125. Id. at 755-57 (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)).
126. Arctic Slope Native Ass'n v. Sebelius, 699 F.3d 1289, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
127. It is unlike, for example, United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003), where the Su-
preme Court found no trust responsibility even though the United States refused to approve a more
equitable royalty rate for the Navajo Nation's coal after the Department of Interior official held secret
meetings with coal company representatives.
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remedies is consistent with holdings in Social Security Act and Federal
Tort Claims Act contexts 29 but inconsistent with those in Title VII cas-
es.130 The impact of the case, therefore, may be greater for class action lit-
igants and the doctrine of equitable tolling generally than for federal In-
dian law.
B. Nebraska v. Parker
Unlike Menominee, Nebraska v. Parker involved issues at the heart
of tribal sovereignty. The boundaries of "Indian country" are key to trib-
al self-governance, marking the line at which state jurisdiction over tribal
citizens generally stops and tribal and federal authority begins. 3 ' All land
within an Indian reservation constitutes Indian country, regardless of
who owns the land.13 2 Nebraska v. Parker concerned whether an 1882
statute opening part of the Omaha Reservation to non-Indian purchase
shrank the boundaries of the reservation. 33 The opened area had long
been owned almost exclusively by non-Indians, but beginning in 2006,
the tribe sought to regulate the sale of liquor at the seven liquor stores in
Pender, the village that dominated the area.m3 The case thus triggered
two subjects-tribal territory in non-Indian dominated areas and tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians-in which the Supreme Court had consist-
ently ruled against Indian tribes for twenty-five years.1 35
The 1882 Act was one of many "allotment acts" that Congress
passed between the 1880s and the 1920s.13 As part of the federal policy
to assimilate and individualize the Indians, allotment opened some tribal
land to non-Indian purchase immediately and allotted much of the re-
mainder to individual Indians. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged,
"[t]he policy of allotment of Indian lands quickly proved disastrous for
128. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749,763-64 (1975).
129. Aguiar v. United States, 818 F.2d 194, 198 (2d Cir. 1987).
130. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405,414 n.8 (1975).
131. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 527 n.1 (1998) ("Generally
speaking, primary jurisdiction [in Indian country] rests with the Federal Government and the Indian
tribe inhabiting it, and not with the States.").
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2012). Indian country also includes all allotments outside reservation
boundaries that are still under Indian ownership, id. § 1151(c), as well as "dependent Indian communi-
ties," id. § 1151(b), and land the federal government has set aside for Indians under federal protection.
Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. at 530.
133. 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).
134. Id. at 1078.
135. The six cases concerning tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians are: Plains Commerce Bank v.
Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Atkinson
Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999);
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); and South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993). The
four cases involving Indian country are: City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S.
197 (2005); Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520 (1998); and South Da-
kota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); Hagen .v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994). An additional
two cases make it harder for tribes to expand their Indian country by giving their land to the United
States to take into trust. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567
U.S. 209 (2012); Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 382 (2009).
136. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,706-07 (1987).
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the Indians."1 3 7 Between 1887 and 1934, 86 million acres of land-almost
two-thirds of the Indian land base-passed out of Indian hands," leaving
Indians landless and impoverished.'39 In 1934, Congress forever repudiat-
ed allotment,'" and in 1948, declared that all land within reservation
boundaries remained Indian country, regardless of who owned it.141
But these statutes did not resolve whether allotment changed reser-
vation boundaries in the first place. The Court has been less than con-
sistent on the issue. Although it has insisted that allotment does not di-
minish a reservation absent "clear and plain" evidence of congressional
intent,142 it has repeatedly found diminishment even though Congress did
not actually say the boundaries would change.143 Even stranger, it has en-
dorsed the use of current demographics -whether mostly Indians or non-
Indians live in the area now, to determine if the area has lost its "Indian
character"-as a factor in the analysis.1" The Court has acknowledged
that modem demographics are an "unorthodox" way to determine what
Congress was thinking a century ago,'1 45 but relies on this factor to avoid
"disrupt[ing] the justifiable expectations" of the non-Indians in the ar-
ea.*4
In 2005, in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, the
Court extended the legal force of non-Indian expectations beyond the
diminishment context.1 47 In Sherrill, the Court held that the expectations
of non-Indian communities prevented the Oneida Indian Nation from
asserting its immunity from state tax on land the tribe owned within its
historic reservation because the state had acquired the land and sold it to
non-Indians long ago.'" This was true even though the Court had earlier
held that the acquisitions were illegal, that no statute of limitations
137. Id. at 707.
138. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 425 n.5 (quoting 2 FRANcIs PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 896 (1984)).
139. See id. (quoting Hearings on H.R. 7902 before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., 15, 17 (1934)).
140. 25 U.S.C § 461 (2012).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2012).
142. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998) (quoting United States v.
Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 736-39 (1986)) (internal quotations omitted); see Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463,
470 (1984) ("Congress [must] clearly evince an intent to change boundaries before diminishment will
be found.") (internal quotations omitted); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 586 (1977);
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444 (1975) ("This Court does not lightly conclude that an
Indian reservation has been terminated . . . The congressional intent must be clear, to overcome the
general rule that [d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people
who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith.") (quoting McClana-
han v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (2001)) (internal citations omitted); Mattz v. Arnett,
412 U.S. 481, 504 (1973) ("[C]lear termination language was not employed in the 1892 Act. This being
so, we are not inclined to infer an intent to terminate the reservation.").
143. Yankton, 522 U.S. at 358; Hagen, 510 U.S. at 421; Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 614; DeCoteau, 420
U.S. at 449.
144. Yankton, 522 U.S. at 356-57; Solem, 465 U.S. at 471-72.
145. Solem, 465 U.S. at 472 n.13.
146. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 421; Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 604-05.
147. 544 U.S. 197,221 (2005).
148. Id. at 215-19.
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barred the land claims, and that the tribes were prevented from earlier
litigating on their own behalf.14 9
Nebraska v. Parker pitted these inconsistent doctrines against each
other. The 1882 Act did not contain any of the language previously found
to indicate diminishment: it did not state that the Omaha Tribe relin-
quished all interests in the land, that the land was being restored to the
public domain, or that the United States would pay the tribe a lump sum
in exchange for the land.' Instead, the Act authorized the United States
to declare the disputed area open for sale and settlement after tribal
members had a chance to select allotments there and directed the gov-
ernment to pay the proceeds of any sales to the tribe.'"' This was almost
the same language found not to constitute diminishment in two earlier
cases.152
Unlike those earlier cases, the demographics were on Nebraska's
side. Less than 2% of the population in the opened area was Indian; no
allotments remained in Indian ownership; and the tribe had exerted little
governmental presence there until recently.' But precedent seemed to
favor the tribe, and both the district court and the Eighth Circuit found
the reservation boundaries remained unchanged.'-' Nebraska sought cer-
tiorari, asking the Court to determine that diminishment might be found
despite "ambiguous evidence" in the statute's language and history if
there had been "de facto diminishment" of the area.15 When the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari, it seemed clear that at least four mem-
bers of the Court thought the answer should be yes.
Paul Clement, a conservative Supreme Court titan and past clerk to
Justice Scalia, joined the attorneys for the Omaha Tribe to represent the
Omaha Tribal Council,156 and the U.S. Solicitor filed and argued against
diminishment as well. The Tribal Supreme Project organized two amicus
briefs. One, from the NCAI, focused on the disruption from changing the
established diminishment test and on the cooperative relationship be-
tween tribes and the many non-Indian towns that existed within reserva-
149. For commentary on the case, see Kathryn Fort, The New Laches: Creating Title Where None
Existed, 16 GEO. MASON L. REv. 357, 375-80 (2009) (criticizing misuse of laches in Sherrill); Joseph
William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title, Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REv. 605,
611-12 (2006).
150. See South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 344 (1998).
151. S.J. Res. 434,47th Cong. (1882).
152. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 473 (1984) (finding 35 Stat. 460 authorizing the Secretary to
"'sell and dispose of all that portion of" the reservations and deposit proceeds for the tribe "suggests
the Secretary of the Interior was simply being authorized to act as the Tribe's sales agent."); Seymour
v. Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 356 (1962) (finding that 34 Stat. 80
provided that certain lands would be open to "settlement and entry under the provisions of the home-
stead laws" and the proceeds would be "'deposited in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of
the"' tribe "did no more than open the way for non-Indian settlers to own land on the reservation.").
153. Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1077-78 (2016).
154. Smith v. Parker, 774 F.3d 1166, 1168-69 (8th Cir. 2014); Smith v. Parker, 996 F. Supp. 2d 815,
844 (D. Neb. 2014).
155. Brief for Petitioners at i, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016) (No. 14-1406).
156. Brief for Respondents Omaha Tribal Council, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016)
(No. 14-1406).
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tion borders.'5 The second, which I wrote with Professor Colette Routel,
was on behalf of scholars of federal Indian law, politics, and history.1 8
A key message of the briefs was that demand for clear evidence of
congressional intent to change reservation boundaries was not some idio-
syncratic aspect of federal Indian law. Rather, it was the same rule ap-
plied to interpreting other statutes alleged to adjust traditional bounda-
ries and relationships with other governments.15 9 In the same way that
Congress "must clearly express its intent" to abrogate treaties with tribal
nations,11 treaties with foreign nations "will not be deemed to have been
abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on the part
of Congress has been clearly expressed."16 ' Similarly, federal statutes will
not be interpreted to operate in the territory of a foreign government un-
less "the affirmative intention of the Congress [is] clearly expressed." 162
In other interpretive rules with parallels to federal Indian law, clear evi-
dence of congressional intent is required to interpret a statute to intrude
on traditional state authority 6 ' or abrogate state sovereign immunity.16
In each of these areas, respect for traditional sovereign rights demands
clear evidence before the Court will breach the traditional boundary
lines between governments.
The briefs also gave context to the Omaha Tribe's slight presence in
the opened area, which was dominated by the town of Pender. First, the
U.S. Commissioner of Indian Affairs inappropriately sought to discour-
age Omahas from selecting allotments there, and, relying on discrimina-
tory homesteading laws, forbade Indians from purchasing land there
once it was open to sale.16 ' Once the land had been allotted, real estate
157. Brief for the National Congress of American Indians, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 15-16, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016) (No. 14-1406).
158. Brief for Historical and Legal Scholars, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016) (No. 14-
1406).
159. Brief for Respondents Omaha Tribal Council, at 23-24, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072
(2016) (No. 14-1406). Brief for Historical and Legal Scholars, at 11, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072
(2016) (No. 14-1406); see Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutional-
ism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARv. L. REv. 381, 416-17 (1993) (discussing simi-
larity between interpretive rules in federal Indian law and clear statement rules courts employ in ques-
tions of federalism and structure of sovereignty); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 405, 458 (1989) (discussing the requirement of a "clear statement
before courts will find congressional displacement of the usual allocation of institutional authority").
160. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172,202 (1999).
161. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (quoting Cook v.
United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933)) (internal quotations omitted).
162. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247,255 (2010) (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,248 (1991)) (internal quotations omitted).
163. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088-89 (2014); cf. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49, 56-57 (1978) (statute would not be interpreted to intrude on tribal sovereignty absent
clear indications of congressional intent).
164. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003) (stating that congressional in-
tent to abrogate state sovereign immunity must be "unmistakably clear"); cf Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Cmty. 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031 (2014) (stating that congressional intent to abrogate tribal sover-
eign immunity must be "clear" and "unequivocal[]").
165. Brief for Respondents Omaha Tribal Council, at 49, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072
(2016) (No. 14-1406); Joint Appendix at 950-52, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016) (No. 14-
1406).
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syndicates known as "the Pender Ring" worked to separate Indians from
their land, often for "ridiculously low rates,"' and initially in violation of
federal law.167 When tribal police tried to evict non-Indians illegally on
allotted land, the county sheriff actually arrested the tribal officers.1`" The
sheriff, in turn, was arrested by the tribal police and tried in tribal
court. 6 9 1In response, William Peebles, a founder of Pender and a leader
in one of the leasing syndicates, purchased 100 rifles to arm a resistance
against enforcement of the law.170 Although violence was averted, the
syndicates later secured replacement of the federal agent who was en-
forcing the law with one who was friendlier to their interests.1 7' Non-
Indians, in other words, worked hard-sometimes illegally and even vio-
lently-to suppress Omaha attempts to preserve their land or assert their
authority.
The briefs also showed why Nebraska's own exercise of jurisdiction
in the opened area should not be relevant to the diminishment inquiry.1 72
First, states have jurisdiction over non-Indian interactions regardless of
reservation boundaries.173 Second, until the 1970s, Nebraska illegally ex-
ercised jurisdiction over Indians throughout the reservation, not just the
opened area.'7 4 In 1953, moreover, Public Law 280 gave Nebraska juris-
diction over Indians on all reservations. 7 5
At oral argument, Justice Scalia seemed particularly dubious about
use of post-enactment events: "I mean, to say, you know, a later Con-
gress did thus and so, and therefore the earlier Congress, when it enacted
a particular statute, must have diminished. That doesn't make any
sense." 1 76 The Justices also pressed the attorney for Nebraska on whether
166. JUDITH A. BOUGHTER, BETRAYING THE OMAHA NATION, 1790-1916, 110, at 142-43,146-47
(1998).
167. Id.; see also Beck v. Flournoy Live-Stock & Real-Estate Co., 65 F. 30, 36 (8th Cir. 1894)
(holding leases illegal).
168. Federal v. State- Government Wins Its Prosecution of Sheriff Mullin, The State (Columbia,
S.C.), Apr. 22, 1895.
169. Id.
170. An Indian War Threatened-Settlers are Armed and Organized in Nebraska, DAILY INTER
OCEAN, July, 19, 1895.
171. BOUGHTER, supra note 166, at 163-64.
172. Brief for Petitioners at 32, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016) (No. 14-1406).
173. Utah & N. Ry. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28, 29 (1885) (taxing jurisdiction); United States v.
McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881) (criminal jurisdiction).
174. Omaha Tribe v. Vill. of Walthill, 334 F. Supp. 823, 835-36 (D. Neb. 1971), aff'd sub nom.
Omaha Tribe of Neb. v. Vill. of Walthill, Neb., 460 F.2d 1327 (8th Cir. 1972) (rejecting jurisdiction
under 1882 Act); MARK R. SCHERER, IMPERFECr VICTORIES: THE LEGAL TENACITY OF THE OMAHA
TRIBE, 1945-1995, 16-17 (1999).
175. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 177 (1973). Although Nebraska
partially retroceded jurisdiction over the Omaha Reservation in 1970, it retained jurisdiction over In-
dians on highways. Its retrocession, moreover, described the reservation as including the Pender area.
Smith v. Parker, 996 F. Supp. 2d 815, 830 (D. Neb. 2014).
176. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5:9-13, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016) (No. 14-
1406) (Scalia, J.). Other Justices were also skeptical. See, e.g., id. at 10:2-10 (Kagan, J.) ("You know,
because usually, at least now, we don't think much of subsequent history of any kind. Now, maybe
they thought a little bit more highly of it in the days when Solem was written, but now it would - it's -
it's pretty much of a stretch to use subsequent legislative history or subsequent history generally when
we're dealing with interpreting a statute.").
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reservation status would make much difference for non-Indians and the
state, given that states retained broad jurisdiction and tribes lacked most
jurisdiction over non-Indians.1 " More troubling for the tribe, Justice Scal-
ia also suggested that Sherrill meant that tribal sovereignty could be lost
by failure to exercise it,"' but the Justices also seemed to believe that
question was not raised by a case solely about reservation boundaries. 9
The mood after the argument was cautiously optimistic.
Justice Scalia's remarks at oral argument suggested that he would
vote against diminishment, but the votes of Justices Roberts, Alito, and
potentially Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, were less certain. Justice
Thomas, meanwhile, had a near-perfect record of voting against tribal
interests. Many were surprised when, six weeks after Justice Scalia's
death on February 13, Justice Thomas authored a unanimous opinion
holding the Omaha Reservation had not been diminished.8 0 One might
even speculate that the unanimity reflected a tribute to Justice Scalia and
his long insistence that statutes should be judged by what they actually
say.
The opinion reaffirmed that only Congress could diminish a reser-
vation and that "its intent to do so must be clear."'"' The primary place to
look for this intent was the text of the statute itself; any other surround-
ing history must "unequivocally reveal a widely held, contemporaneous
understanding that the affected reservation would shrink as a result of
the proposed legislation."'1 While the Court did not state that earlier de-
cisions were wrong to consider demographic evidence, it seriously dis-
counted the value of such evidence. It declared it "not our role to 're-
write' the 1882 Act in light of this subsequent demographic history,""'
which was "the least compelling" element in the diminishment inquiry.&
The Court called the "justifiable expectations" of the non-Indians who
lived in the area "compelling" but stated that only Congress, not expecta-
177. See, e.g., id at 9:9-13 (Sotomayor, J.) ("What-what else-what else do you lose if this ruling is
against you? We've already circumscribed the powers of the Tribes on their own reservations greatly,
so what powers do you lose?"); id. at 12:5-14:12 (Alito, Scalia & Sotomayor, JJ.); id. at 36:17-22 (not-
ing that the liquor regulation giving rise to the case was unusual, because it resulted from a specific
federal authorization of tribal regulation pursuant to the broad federal power over sales of alcohol on
reservations); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (2012); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 547 (1975). It is
not settled whether this authorization applies in non-Indian communities on reservations, see Pitts-
burgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1544 n.13 (10th Cir. 1995) (suggesting it
does not), but see City of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux, 10 F.3d 554, 557-58 (8th Cir. 1993)
(holding that it does).
178. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18:21-19:3, 27:9-22, 45:12-46:5, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S.
Ct. 1072 (2016) (No. 14-1406) (Scalia, J.).
179. Id. at 7:5-19 (Roberts, C.J.); Id. at 20:20-21:10 (Kagan, J.).
180. Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).
181. Id. at 1078-79.
182. Id. at 1080 (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 471 (1984)).
183. Id. at 1082 (quoting DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Court for Tenth Judicial Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 447
(1975)). DeCoteau, notably, held that a reservation had been diminished, and the history it was refus-
ing to rewrite was the entire history of allotment. 420 U.S. at 447.
184. Parker, 136 S. Ct. at 1082 (quoting South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S. 329, 356
(1998)).
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tions, could diminish reservation boundaries.'8 Finally, because the peti-
tion raised only the diminishment question, the Court "express[ed] no
view" about whether Sherrill supported curtailing the tribe's governmen-
tal powers."'
While the reference to Sherrill foretells battles for another day, the
opinion as a whole represents a victory for Indian tribes. It affirms the
clear intent standard and cabins attempts to expand reliance on present
demographics. Its impact may be even more wide ranging. In several ar-
eas, the Court has striven to accommodate the alleged expectations of
non-Indians within tribal borders, bending rules of statutory construc-
tion, equitable remedies, and allocation of power between Congress and
Court to do so.5" Perhaps this decision may help to establish that the
wishes of this favored group are not enough to make the Court depart
from its usual interpretive role.
C. United States v. Bryant
United States v. Bryant concerned the constitutional status of tribal
governmental powers. In 2005, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 117, which
made it a felony to commit domestic assault in Indian country if the of-
fender already has two or more convictions for domestic violence by a
federal, state, or tribal court.'* The law was a partial response to a crimi-
nal justice crisis. Native women face the highest rates of domestic vio-
lence of any group in the United States, with 46% -almost one in two-
experiencing domestic violence in their lifetimes.'" Yet, states generally
lack jurisdiction over crimes committed between Indians on reservations
and often do not enforce the jurisdiction they do have.'" Tribes do have
jurisdiction over intra-Indian crimes but can generally sentence defend-
ants to no more than one year in prison."'9 Section 117, therefore, could
be seen as "the first true effort to remove these recidivists from the
communities that they repeatedly terrorize."192
Sounds good, right? Under the statute, the federal government can
prosecute habitual abusers as felons, and somewhat shrink the enforce-
ment gap. Michael Bryant is precisely the kind of serial offender Con-
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Fort, supra note 149 (criticizing misuse of laches in Sherrill); Philip P. Frickey, A
Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture Of Indian Tribal Authority over
Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 25-26 (1999) (criticizing this trend in both diminishment and tribal ju-
risdiction cases); Ann E. Tweedy, Unjustifiable Expectations: Laying to Rest the Ghosts of Allotment-
Era Settlers, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 129 (2012) (arguing that allotment era settlers could have no valid
expectations against tribal jurisdiction).
188. 18 U.S.C. § 117 (2012).
189. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1959 (2016).
190. Id. at 1960-61.
191. Id. at 1960. The 2010 Tribal Law and Order Act permitted tribes to sentence offenders to up
to three years in prison if they put a number of procedural protections in place, but few tribes have
done so yet. Id.
192. United States v. Bryant, 792 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2015) (Owens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 20171926
HOPE FOR INDIAN TRIBES
gress intended to reach. As described by the dissent to the Ninth Cir-
cuit's refusal to review the case en banc,
Michael Bryant likes to beat women. Sometimes he kicks them.
Sometimes he punches them. Sometimes he drags them by their
hair. He punched and kicked one girlfriend repeatedly, threw her to
the floor, and even bit her. When he could not find his keys, he
choked another woman to the verge of passing out. Although his
violence varies, his punishment never does. Despite Bryant's brutal-
ity-resulting in seven convictions for domestic violence-his worst
sentence was a slap on the wrist: one year imprisonment, or what
someone who "borrows" a neighbor's People magazine from the
mailbox on two separate occasions could face.19
In February 2011, after over 100 tribal court convictions for domes-
tic abuse and other crimes, Bryant was arrested for "attacking his then
girlfriend, dragging her off the bed, pulling her hair, and repeatedly
punching and kicking her."'1 He admitted to law enforcement that he
had physically assaulted her five or six times before.1 95 Three months lat-
er, he assaulted a new girlfriend, "choking her until she almost lost con-
sciousness," again admitting multiple assaults in just the two months they
had dated.'" Federal felony sentencing of Bryant could remove a preda-
tor who had victimized many women from the Northern Cheyenne
community.
This is the problem: because tribal sovereignty does not derive from
the Constitution and tribes have not consented to it, tribes are not bound
to constitutional requirements."9 The Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA")
does require tribes to abide by guarantees very similar to the Bill of
Rights,99 and criminal defendants may vindicate these rights via habeas
actions in federal court.'" But ICRA protections are not identical to their
constitutional counterparts. In particular, tribes need not provide crimi-
nal defendants with counsel before imposing sentences of less than one
year.o Therefore, although Michael Bryant had not had counsel for any
of his tribal court convictions, those convictions were valid under federal
law. 201 But the federal government, of course, is subject to the Constitu-
tion. Bryant asked whether the federal government could constitutionally
use uncounseled tribal court convictions to qualify a defendant for habit-
ual offender status.
Earlier decisions narrowed the question but did not answer it. In
Burgett v. Texas, the Court held that a conviction obtained in violation of
the right to counsel could not be used to either "support guilt or enhance
193. Id. at 1044-45.
194. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1963.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
198. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
199. Id. § 1303.
200. Id. § 1302(a)(6).
201. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1963.
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punishment for another offense" because the accused would thereby
"suffer[] anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right." 202
The Court subsequently held in Scott v. Illinois that the right to counsel
did not apply to misdemeanor convictions not carrying a sentence of im-
prisonment. 20 3 The following year, Baldasar v. Illinois held that an un-
counseled misdemeanor conviction could not be used to enhance a de-
fendant's sentence for a later crime, but the five Justices joining the per
curiam opinion did not agree on a rationale for the holding?24 In 1994,
Nichols v. United States reversed Baldasar, finding that "an uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no prison term was
imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent
conviction." 2 05
What did Nichols and Burgett mean for an uncounseled, but valid,
tribal court conviction for which a prison term had been imposed? More
generally, did Nichols apply beyond its sentence enhancement context to
habitual offender statutes where the previous conviction was an element
of the crime itself? Some dicta in Nichols suggested it did. The Nichols
Court referred in passing to "recidivist statutes," noting that "[t]his Court
consistently has sustained repeat-offender laws as penalizing only the last
offense committed by the defendant." 206 Other parts of Nichols, however,
emphasized the sentencing versus element distinction, calling the sen-
tencing process "less exacting than the process of establishing guilt" be-
cause contributing factors needed to be proved only by a preponderance
of evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt?20 This language sug-
gested that concern for the reliability of uncounseled convictions, one of
the rationales for both the right to counsel and a Baldasar concurrence, 208
might still prevent uncounseled convictions from being used in habitual
offender statutes. Cases before and after Nichols provided ammunition
for both sides but no clear answers in this debate.209
202. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967).
203. 440 U.S. 367,373-74 (1979).
204. 446 U.S. 222, 224 (1980). In Baldasar, Justice Blackmun argued that Scott was incorrectly
decided and that the Sixth Amendment always required counsel for criminal defendants. Id. at 229-30
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Three Justices joined an opinion arguing that an uncounseled conviction
lacked sufficient reliability to be used for sentence enhancement. Id. at 227-28 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring). Justice Stewart, however, referred simply to the logic of the Court's prior cases without explana-
tion. Id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring).
205. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748-49 (1994).
206. Id. at 747 (quoting Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 232) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
207. Id. at 747-48.
208. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 227-28 (Marshall, J., concurring).
209. Alabama v. Shelton recited the reliability concern in holding that the Sixth Amendment re-
quired counsel before a conviction resulting in a suspended sentence. 535 U.S. 654, 667 (2002). The
Court stated that "the key Sixth Amendment inquiry" was "whether the adjudication of guilt corre-
sponding to the prison sentence is sufficiently reliable to permit incarceration."). Id. A pre-Nichols
case, Lewis v. United States, held that an uncounseled felony conviction could be used to support a
conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, stating that "[t]he federal gun laws, however, focus
not on reliability but on the mere fact of conviction, or even indictment, in order to keep firearms
away from potentially dangerous persons." 445 U.S. 55, 67 (1980). A subsequent pre-Nichols case,
however, United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, distinguished Lewis to hold that it was unconstitutional to
convict someone of reentering the United States after deportation without permitting the defendant to
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In 2011, both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, in the euphoniously
named United States v. Cavanaugh and United States v. Shavanaux, up-
held use of uncounseled tribal court convictions to establish habitual of-
fender status under 18 U.S.C. § 117.210 In United States v. Bryant, the
Ninth Circuit ruled the other way.211 The Bryant panel relied in part on
the Ninth Circuit's 1994 decision in United States v. Ant, holding that an
uncounseled tribal court guilty plea could not be used as evidence of guilt
in a subsequent federal prosecution. 2 1 2 The Bryant panel also found that
Nichols should be read to only apply to cases of sentence enhancement
and that considering an uncounseled conviction in a habitual offender
statute case remained unconstitutional. 2 13
The majority opinion in Bryant paid little attention to the distinctive
Indian law aspects of the issue. Judge Paul Watford, however, concurred
to state that, as the convictions themselves were constitutional, presuma-
bly the majority was motivated by concerns about the reliability of the
convictions.2 14 Since uncounseled state and federal court convictions were
sufficiently reliable to convict a defendant for gun possession after con-
viction of a felony,21 5 however, he argued:
[A]ren't we really saying that the right to appointed counsel is nec-
essary to ensure the reliability of all tribal court convictions? If
that's true, we seem to be denigrating the integrity of tribal courts.
The implication is that, if the defendant lacks counsel, tribal court
convictions are inherently suspect and unworthy of the federal
courts' respect. While in our adversarial system we've concluded
that the lack of counsel detracts from the accuracy and fairness of a
criminal proceeding,... respect for the integrity of an independent
sovereign's courts should preclude such quick judgment.2 16
The Ninth Circuit, over the dissents of eight judges, denied review en
banc,21 7 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In the Supreme Court, Elizabeth Prelogar, a past clerk to Judge
Merrick Garland and Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, represented the
United States. The Tribal Supreme Court Project also helped to organize
three amicus briefs. One, from the NCAI, emphasized the regularity of
procedures in tribal courts and Northern Cheyenne courts, and the long
challenge due process infirmities in the previous deportation. 481 U.S. 828, 839 (1987). Medoza-Lopez,
however, relied on the constitutionally bizarre status of deportation proceedings, where statutes forbidjudicial review. Id. at 836-41.
210. See United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2011); see also United States v.
Shayanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir. 2011). For discussion of the two opinions and the differences
in their approach, see Christiana Martenson, Note, Uncounseled Tribal Court Guilty Pleas in State and
Federal Courts: Individual Rights Versus Tribal Self-Governance, 111 MICH. L. REv. 617, 628-32(2013).
211. United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671,679 (9th Cir. 2014).
212. 882 F.2d 1389, 1395 (9th Cir. 1989). Judge Watford concurred in the opinion solely because
he believed the decision was controlled by Ant. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 679 (Watford J., concurring).
213. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 679.
214. Id. at 680-81 (Watford, J., concurring).
215. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 67 (1980).
216. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 680 (Watford, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
217. United States v. Bryant, 792 F.3d 1042, 1042 (9th Cir. 2015).
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history-extending across many states and federal settings-of recogniz-
ing such proceedings as a matter of comity.218 That brief countered one
from the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers that relied
on fifty-year-old quotes calling tribal courts "kangaroo courts,"
2 19 and
mocking tribal court judges as "well-intentioned laypersons" unprepared
"to effectively guarantee the complex, quasi-constitutional rights en-
shrined in ICRA .... "2
A second amicus, from the National Indigenous Women's Resource
Center and other domestic violence organizations, emphasized the do-
mestic violence crisis in Indian country and the jurisdictional gaps neces-
sitating 18 U.S.C. § 117.221 A third amicus, from former attorneys general
from seven states with substantial Indian territories, focused on recidi-
vism among abusers and the importance of federal felony jurisdiction. 22 2
Justice Ginsburg spent much of her opinion for the Supreme Court dis-
cussing the facts in these two briefs: the crisis of domestic violence
against Indian women, the failures of the existing jurisdictional scheme
to address it, the high recidivism among abusers, and Michael Bryant's
own horrendous history of hurting woman after woman.22
Justice Ginsburg's linking of tribal self-governance with protection
of women is significant. Justice Ginsburg's first known encounter with
federal Indian law came in the 1970s when, as director of the ACLU's
Women's Rights Project, she decided the project should file an amicus
brief in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martine 224 arguing for federal invalidation
of a Santa Clara Pueblo ordinance that denied tribal membership to the
children of female members with nonmembers. 22 Some have speculated
that this early experience, plus her lack of other exposure to Indian
tribes, gave her a general concern about the fairness of tribal govern-
ments.2 26 Since joining the Court in 1993, Justice Ginsburg has written
some of the opinions that have pushed precedent furthest against the in-
terests of Indian tribes. 227 A 2009 study found that she wrote a dispropor-
tionate share of Indian law opinions and that tribes lost in a dispropor-
tionate number of those cases. 2 28 More recent Ginsburg opinions,
218. Brief for National Congress of American Indians as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
20-21, United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016) (No. 15-420).
219. Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Experienced Tribal
Court Criminal Litigators as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8, Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (No.
15-420).
220. Id. at 20-21.
221. See generally Brief for National Indigenous Women's Resource Center et al., as Amici Curi-
ae Supporting Petitioner, Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (No. 15-420).
222. Brief for Denis Burke et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, Bryant, 136 S. Ct.
1954 (No. 15-420).
223. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1959-61, 1963-64 (2016).
224. See 436 U.S. 49, 51 (1978); see also Goldberg, supra note 69 at 1005.
225. Goldberg, supra note 69, at 1006.
226. Id.
227. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 214 (2005); Strate v. A-1 Con-
tractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997)
228. Goldberg, supra note 69, at 1013-14.
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however, suggest a new appreciation of the role tribal institutions play in
protecting vulnerable populations,229 and Bryant extends this trend.
But the legal rationale of the opinion did what criminal defense ad-
vocates had feared. It adopted the dicta of Nichols to hold that across the
board, "convictions valid when entered-that is, those that, when ren-
dered, did not violate the Constitution-retain that status when invoked
in a subsequent proceeding."2 0 The possibility that Nichols could be lim-
ited to sentencing enhancements was gone. Even more damaging, the
opinion could be read to undermine the reliability concerns behind Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence, which had been preserved to a degree in
Nichols. "Scott and Nichols," the Bryant Court declared, "counter the ar-
gument that uncounseled misdemeanor convictions are categorically un-
reliable, either in their own right or for use in a subsequent proceed-
ing."23 The Court also reached a due process argument that the
Respondent urged it to avoid,23 2 declaring that since federal habeas re-
view was available to challenge Bryant's convictions at the time they
were made, there were no due process problems with using the convic-
tions in the current proceeding.
Bryant, therefore, potentially does damage to the interests of crimi-
nal defendants generally. It did not have to be that way. Had the Court
more heavily relied on the role of courts in recognizing the actions of
separate sovereigns, it could have ruled for the United States without de-
ciding larger issues.
The doctrine of comity, which is applied to judgments of foreign
governments, permits recognition of foreign judgments even though
those courts do not grant the protections the Constitution requires. 2 3
Most federal and state courts apply this standard to tribal court judg-
ments.25 Using the comity standard, states and lower federal courts have
approved use of prior convictions from foreign nations that did not meet
constitutional standards both as predicate offenses and for sentence en-
hancement.2 3 6 In 2005, the Supreme Court stated that Congress could
229. See generally Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). See also Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (joining opinion by So-
tomayor, J., dissenting).
230. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1965 (2016).
231. Id. at 1966.
232. Brief for the Respondent at 38-44, Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (No. 15-420).
233. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1966.
234. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 998-1000 (10th Cir. 2011); Martenson, supra note
210, at 635-39.
235. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 104, at § 7.07[2][a].
236. See, e.g., United States v. Kole, 164 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that Philippine convic-
tion obtained without jury trial could be used to trigger mandatory felony sentence in United States);
Houle v. United States, 493 F.2d 915, 916 n.2 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d
755 (W.D. Pa. 2002), rev'd on other grounds, Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005) (holding that
Japanese conviction that would have violated right to speedy trial, hearsay, and in which counsel was
denied at key points, could be used as predicate offense for felony firearm possession); State v.
Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d 530 (Minn. 2006) (holding that a Wisconsin DUI conviction that would have vio-
lated Minnesota constitutional right to counsel could be used to convert Minnesota offense to felony);
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make a foreign conviction a predicate offense for federal prosecution,
even though it recognized that foreign courts might grant defendants
lesser protections.2 37 Had the Court explicitly applied the comity standard
in Bryant, it could have avoided clothing its decision in the Sixth
Amendment.
A comity standard would also have ensured protection for defend-
ants whose prior convictions were used in subsequent prosecutions.
While comity extends a presumption of validity to foreign judgments, the
judgments are reviewed to determine if they violate "fundamental fair-
ness.""5 Notably, this standard is not the same as that in the United
States Constitution. Therefore, as the Fifth Circuit stated in upholding
the use of uncounseled Canadian convictions, courts "decline to assume
that .. . a foreign system, utilizing procedures with which we are unfamil-
iar, has failed to provide a fair trial if it does not conform with our right-
to-counsel concepts."23 9 In the tribal context, the Ninth Circuit itself has
stated that "extending comity to tribal judgments is not an invitation for
the federal courts to exercise unnecessary judicial paternalism in deroga-
tion of tribal self-governance."240
In Bryant, the Supreme Court stated that the federal interest in due
process was sufficiently protected by ICRA, which permits federal habe-
as challenges to tribal convictions.241 But the Court did not say that de-
State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Mont. 2003) ("Comity requires that a court give full effect
to the valid judgments of a foreign jurisdiction according to that sovereign's laws, not the Sixth
Amendment standard that applies to proceedings in Montana."); State v. Meyer, 613 P.2d 132
(Wash.Ct. App. 1980) (holding that uncounseled Canadian convictions could be used for impeachment
in state court); see also United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1346 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting chal-
lenge to sentence that considered uncounseled Mexican convictions). A number of states use foreign
nation convictions in their implementation of habitual offender statutes. Martha Kimes, Note, The
Effect of Foreign Criminal Convictions Under American Repeat Offender Statutes: A Case Against the
Use of Foreign Crimes in Determining Habitual Criminal Status, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 503,
507-11 (1997) (noting that eight states did so in the text of the statute, and others interpret ambiguous
statutes to include foreign convictions).
237. Small, 544 U.S. at 394. Small concerned whether a defendant previously convicted of felony
arms trafficking in Japan could be convicted under a statute that forbid "any person ... convicted in
any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . [from] . . . pos-
sess[ing] . . . any firearm." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). The Court concluded that without evidence
that Congress intended to include foreign convictions in the phrase "convicted in any court," the stat-
ute would be interpreted to reach domestic crimes only. Small, 544 U.S. at 390-91. The Court reached
this conclusion in part because foreign convictions might be "inconsistent with an American under-
standing of fairness." Id. at 401-02. Indeed, although the Supreme Court did not discuss it, Small al-
leged that he had been denied counsel at crucial stages of the proceedings. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d at
766. Nevertheless, the Court stated that "Congress, of course, remains free to change this conclusion
through statutory amendment." Small, 544 U.S. at 394.
238. See also Kimes, supra note 236, at 515-18 (discussing courts' use of fundamental fairness
standard in evaluating foreign convictions).
239. Houle, 493 F.2d at 916.
240. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted); see
United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding tribal convictions should be
subject to same generous standard given to foreign judgments); Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d at 1245-4 (de-
scribing risks to tribal sovereignty in evaluating tribal convictions according to United States constitu-
tional standards); see also Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000) (declaring
that a judgment could be recognized so long as it met an "international concept of due process," a
"less demanding" standard than "the complex concept that has emerged from American case law").
241. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1966 (2016); see 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012).
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fendants could also launch a collateral attack on ICRA grounds when the
conviction was used in a habitual offender prosecution, and language in
the opinion could be read to suggest that they could not.2 4 2 Explicitly
adopting a comity standard, in contrast, would make clear that tribal
convictions could be challenged collaterally in federal court as well. In
short, by failing to adequately account for tribal sovereign status, both
the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court missed an opportunity to at once
protect United States and tribal interests in tribal self-governance while
preserving fundamental fairness for all.
D. Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
Dollar General v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians2 4 3 was far
and away the closest-watched federal Indian law case in the 2015 Term.
It was the most important case for Indian communities, with the poten-
tial to limit the jurisdiction of every tribal court in the country. It was the
subject of commentary in the New York Times,2" the Atlantic,24 5 and Sa-
mantha Bee's evening television show Full Frontal.2" The case generated
eleven amicus briefs on the merits, including one group of six states for
the Petitioner 247 and another group of six states for the Respondent.2" In
oral arguments, it pitted three leading Supreme Court advocates against
each other, Thomas Goldstein for the Petitioner, and Neal Katyal and
U.S. Solicitor General Edwin Kneedler for the Respondent. 2 49 Out of the
eighty cases heard in the 2015 Term, moreover, Dollar General took
longest to decide, with more than seven months from oral argument until
the Court finally split four-four.
If past is prologue, it was also the case that tribes were least likely to
win. The case concerned the extent of tribal court jurisdiction over non-
Indians. The Court has issued six opinions on this subject since 1990 and
ruled against Indian tribes in every one. Although precedent tended to
242. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1966 (stating that the habeas challenge is the "means" by which "a pris-
oner may challenge the fundamental fairness of the proceedings in tribal court," but not stating that it
is the only means of challenging that fairness.).
243. 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
244. Ned Blackhawk, The Struggle for Justice on Tribal Lands, N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/opinion/the-struggle-for-justice-on-tribal-lands.html?_ r=0.
245. Garrett Epps, Who Can Tribal Courts Try?, ATLANTIC (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/who-can-tribal-courts-try/419037/.
246. Peter Weber, Samantha Bee Looks at Tribal Sovereignty and its Strange Array of Powerful
Enemies, WEEK (June 21, 2016), http://theweek.com/speedreads/631404/samantha-bee-looks-tribal-
sovereignty-strange-array-powerful-enemies.
247. Brief for the States of Oklahoma et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Dollar Gen.
Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496).
248. Brief for the States of Mississippi et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Dollar
Gen. Corp.v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496).
249. No. 13-1496, SuPREME Cr. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/
docketfiles/13-1496.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2017).
250. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008); Nevada v.
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); El Paso Nat. Gas Co.
v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); South Dakota v.
Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
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support jurisdiction in Dollar General, no previous cases were squarely
on point. Since 1997, moreover, each time past decisions seemed to sup-
port jurisdiction, the Court had reinterpreted its precedent or reframed
the case to find that it did not. When the Court granted certiorari, it
seemed, the writing was on the wall.
The trend against tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians began in
1978, when, in an opinion by then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, the Su-
preme Court held that tribes lacked any criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians committing crimes in their territory.251 Two years later, with little
discussion, the Court upheld tribal taxes on non-Indians purchasing ciga-
rettes on tribal land, stating that taxing jurisdiction did not follow the
same rules as criminal jurisdiction.2 52 The next year, however, Montana v.
United States held that the Crow Tribe lacked jurisdiction to regulate
hunting and fishing by non-Indians on non-Indian owned land on reser-
vations. 253 The Montana Court "readily agree[d]" that tribes could regu-
late activities by non-Indians on Indian-owned or trust land.25 Even on
non-Indian land, the Court held that tribes could regulate activities of
those who "enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members,
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements,"
or whose activity "threatens or has some direct effect on the political in-
tegrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." 255
But between 1997 and 2008, the Court circumscribed the jurisdic-
tion Montana left behind. With respect to land ownership, the Court first
held that Montana's limitation on jurisdiction applied to tribal trust land
if the tribe had formally granted access to non-Indians without explicitly
reserving jurisdiction,256 and then seemed to hold it applied even if the
tribe had not granted access to the land?7 With respect to the consensual
relationship exception, the Court first held that there must be a close
nexus between the consensual relationship and the cause of action, 258 and
later found that a tribal court warrant given to state officers was not a
qualifying consensual relationship.5 9 With respect to the "direct effects"
basis for jurisdiction, the Court first suggested that it did not give tribes
jurisdiction over actions endangering the economic security or health and
welfare of tribal members unless they also undermined tribal -self-
251. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194-95 (1978).
252. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980). While parts of the
Confederated Tribes opinion could be read to suggest that it applied only to tribal trust land, others
indicate that it applies to all doing business on the reservation generally.
253. 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
254. Id. at 557.
255. Id. at 565-66 (citations omitted).
256. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,454 (1997).
257. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 374 (2001) (applying Montana to dispute arising at tribal
member's home on trust land).
258. Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 656 (2001); Strate, 520 U.S. at 457 (hold-
ing that the tribe could not exercise jurisdiction over a private citizen suit against a non-Indian con-
tractor on the reservation to do work with the tribe because "the [Tlribes were strangers to the acci-
dent").
259. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359 n.3.
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governance,26 and later dicta suggested that the impact must "imperil"
the tribe.2 61 Along the way, the Court essentially interpreted out of exist-
ence three post-Montana opinions stating that tribal taxing and judicial
jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservations remained quite broad.26 2
Despite all this, Dollar General seemed to present a strong and
sympathetic case for tribal jurisdiction. The case was a tort suit by a mi-
nor citizen of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians claiming that the
manager of a Dollar General store on the Mississippi Band reservation
had sexually abused him when he was thirteen years old. 263 Explicit con-
sensual agreements brought Dollar General to the reservation and the
Choctaw plaintiff into its store. The store was on tribal land, and in its
lease with the tribe, Dollar General agreed that it would "comply with all
codes and requirements of all tribal and federal laws and regula-
tions ... which. . . are applicable and pertain to [Dolgencorp's] specific
use of the demised premises," and that "[e]xclusive venue and jurisdic-
tion shall be in the Tribal Court."2 " The alleged abuse occurred while the
plaintiff was interning at the store pursuant to a tribal Youth Opportuni-
ty Program, which placed young people for job training at reservation
businesses. 265 Dollar General had agreed to participate in the program.26 6
Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit found these consensual
relationships gave the tribal court jurisdiction over the suit.267 Dollar
General, however, argued that the consensual relationship exception
could never support a tort suit2 0 and, more broadly, that tribes should
260. Strate, 520 U.S. at 458.
261. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 341 (2008).
262. Compare Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) ("Tribal authority over the
activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty. Civil jurisdic-
tion over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific
treaty provision or federal statute.") (citations omitted), and Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855 (1985) (holding that tribal court civil jurisdiction not foreclosed like
civil jurisdiction and required a search for whether federal statutes and treaties have removed it, and
this search must be conducted in first instance by tribal courts), with Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 ('[Iowa
Mutual's language] "stands for nothing more than the unremarkable proposition that, where tribes
possess authority to regulate the activities of nonmembers, '[c]ivil jurisdiction over [disputes arising
out of] such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts."'); compare Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982) ("The power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty be-
cause it is a necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management [which] does not de-
rive solely from the Indian tribe's power to exclude non-Indians from tribal lands [but] from the tribe's
general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction . . . ."), with Atkin-
son Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 653 (2001) (stating that this language in Merrion was dicta and that Mon-
tana's presumption against tribal jurisdiction fully applies to taxing jurisdiction).
263. Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 2014).
264. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2-3, Dollar Gen.
Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496).
265. Dolgencorp, 746 F.3d at 169.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 173; Dolgencorp Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 846 F. Supp. 2d 646, 650 (S.D.
Miss. 2011).
268. Dolgencorp, 746 F.3d at 174; Brief for Petitioners at 18, Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of
Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496).
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never have adjudicatory jurisdiction over non-member defendants. 2 6 9 It
supported these arguments less with precedent than with the alleged un-
fairness-and even unconstitutionality- of subjecting non-Indians to
tribal courts.27 0
The reality of the tribal court here undermined this fairness argu-
ment. The Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians is an economic success
story, whose manufacturing, agricultural, and tourism businesses make it
one of the largest employers in the state.2 71 The tribe has a civil court, a
criminal court, and a three-justice supreme court.27 2 All judges must have
graduated from an accredited law school and be members of the Missis-
sippi Bar.27 The Mississippi Band courts follow an extensive written code
(which includes several articles of the Uniform Commercial Code), their
rules of procedure and evidence are modeled on the Mississippi rules,
and they apply federal and state law where tribal written or common law
does not resolve an issue. 2 7 4 Thousands of non-Indians file cases in the
tribal courts every year, largely in debt collection and garnishment suits,
and win 85% of their cases. 2 75 Dollar General's arguments that Mississip-
pi Band courts could not fairly hear cases against non-Indians, therefore,
seemed based on little more than the fact that they were tribal courts.
Samantha Bee, alluding to Donald Trump's argument that a federal dis-
trict court judge's Mexican heritage made him unable to be fair in his
case, noted that "[t]he 'brown judges aren't being fair to me' argument is
being made right now, in the Supreme Court, which will decide as early
as tomorrow whether tribe members can sue Dollar General for an al-
leged sexual assault against a 13-year-old boy." 2 76
The line-up of amicus briefs made the case look more like an effort
to protect big business than to preserve fairness. In addition to the States
of Oklahoma, Wyoming, Utah, Michigan, Arizona, and Alabama, the
Retail Litigation Center, the Association of American Railroads, and the
South Dakota Bankers Association filed on behalf of Dollar General. 2 7 7
269. Brief for Petitioners at 17, Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct.
2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496) ("[T]ribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers is fundamentally incompati-
ble with the United States' 'overriding sovereignty."').
270. See generally id.
271. Dennis Hevesi, Phillip Martin, Who Led His Tribe to Wealth, Is Dead at 83, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb.
15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/15/us/15martin.html; Mississippi's Largest Private Sector
Employers, MISS. ST. U. C. Bus., http://business.msstate.edulprograms/ib/resources/ms/index.php (list-
ing Mississippi Choctaw as fourth largest public sector employer in the state).
272. Brief for Petitioners at 4-5, Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct.
2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496).
273. Id. at 5.
274. Id. at 6.
275. Id. at 7.
276. Weber, supra note 246.
277. Brief for Retail Litigation Center, Inc., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Dollar
Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496); Brief for Ass'n' of
American Railroads as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Dollar Gen., 136 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 13-
1496); Brief for the States of Oklahoma et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner; Dollar Gen.,
136 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 13-1496); Brief for the South Dakota Bankers Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners; Dollar General, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 13-1496).
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In contrast, the ACLU, along with the National Women's Indigenous
Resource Center and other groups for sexual assault survivors, the
NCAI, a group of fifteen tribes and tribal court groups, historical and le-
gal scholars, and the States of Mississippi, Colorado, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oregon, and Washington filed briefs on behalf of the Mississippi
Band.278
The argument on December 7, 2015, was as bad as tribal supporters
had feared. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan did have
tough questions for Thomas Goldstein about the legal basis of Dollar
General's arguments. 2 7 9 But when Neal Katyal stepped up to argue on
behalf of the Mississippi Band the argument became a blood bath. Chief
Justice Roberts interrupted Katyal's opening statement by asking, "We
have never before recognized tribal court jurisdiction over a non-
member, have we?"2o This is technically true, although the Court has re-
peatedly said that jurisdiction did exist,m' and has held that arguments
against jurisdiction must first be exhausted in tribal courts.2 When
Katyal pointed this out, Justice Scalia stepped in to say, "That's dictum.
Dictum is dictum."283 Soon the Justices were interrupting each other with
hostile questions,2 leaving Katyal, one of the most successful Supreme
Court advocates working today, left saying merely, "If-if there's-" and
"Well-well, I-" before they jumped in again? Justice Kennedy also re-
peatedly pushed his pet theory that the Constitution somehow prohibits
tribal jurisdiction over nontribal citizens.28 When Solicitor General
Kneedler stood up, he at least got to state that Congress had repeatedly
reviewed the operations of tribal courts in light of decisions supporting
civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, and Congress concluded that tribal
courts were essential instruments of self-government that should be sup-
278. Brief for Nat'l Congress of American Indians, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respond-
ents, Dollar Gen., 136 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 13-1496); Brief for the Puyallup Tribe Of Indians, et al. as Ami-
ci Curiae Supporting Respondents, Dollar Gen., 136 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 13-1496); Brief for Historians &
Legal Scholars Gregory Ablavsky, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Dollar Gen., 136 S.
Ct. 2159 (No. 13-1496); Brief for the Cherokee Nation, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respond-
ents, Dollar Gen., 136 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 13-1496); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents, Dollar Gen., 136 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 13-1496); Brief for Nat'l Indigenous Women's
Res. Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Dollar Gen., 1336 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 13-1496).
279. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6:15-21, 8:13-15, 13:5-7 (Ginsburg, J.), 10:21-24 (So-
tomayor, J.), 11:24-12:11, 16:20-17:4, 18:3-10 (Breyer, J.), 19:13-20:3 (Kagan, J.), Dollar Gen., 136 S.
Ct. 2159 (No. 13-1496).
280. Id. at 29:8-10.
281. See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,453 (1997) ("[W]here tribes possess authori-
ty to regulate the activities of nonmembers, '[c]ivil jurisdiction over [disputes arising out of] such activ-
ities presumptively lies in the tribal courts . . . .' (quoting Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9,
18 (1987)).
282. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 13-15; Nat'l Farmers Ins. v. LaPlante, 471 U.S. 845, 856
(1985).
283. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30:17-18 (Scalia, J), Dollar Gen., 136 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 13-
1496).
284. Id. at 35:5-11 (Kennedy & Roberts, J.J.).
285. Id. at 34:11, 22.
286. See, e.g., id. at 35:9-11 ("I don't know what authority Congress has to subject citizens of the
United States to that nonconstitutional forum.") (Kennedy, J.).
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ported." Justice Scalia, however, jumped in to say they were only essen-
tial for disputes between tribal members, and to question the legal value
of the congressional committee reports.'
At the end of the argument, it was pretty clear the vote would be at
least five-four against tribal jurisdiction. Justice Scalia's death shifted the
balance in this case. After struggling and failing to reach a majority, on
June 23, 2016, the Court issued a four-four memorandum opinion affirm-
ing the Fifth Circuit. 2 89
E. Conclusion
By June of most years, professors of federal Indian law are reeling,
wondering how we can maintain our faith in the rule of law given the
Court's latest assault on precedent. Last June was different. A pattern
formed over twenty-five years does not change overnight, but 2016 was
at least a break in that pattern. The next Part discusses whether it was
anything more.
IV. THE 2015 TERM AND THE THIRD SOVEREIGN
One should not overstate the significance of the 2015 Term. There
were no major changes to existing precedent, and the successes involved
significant support from the United States. While Justice Scalia would
have been a deciding vote only in Dollar General, future cases will likely
involve more evenly divided deciding votes. The failure to robustly adopt
a comity approach in Bryant, together with Justice Thomas's concurrence
in that case, highlights the need for a coherent legal theory of tribal sov-
ereignty. In short, while incremental progress was made, the clearest suc-
cess of the 2016 Term is that tribal sovereignty did not receive the kinds
of blows we have come to expect from the Court.
First, none of the cases fundamentally change past precedent or es-
tablished practice. Nebraska v. Parker, with its emphasis on statutory
language, might have changed the result in cases like Osage Nation v. Ir-
by, 290 in which the Tenth Circuit found that a statute simply providing for
allotment to tribal members resulted in diminishment. It may also con-
tribute to a broader effort to restrain the Court from eroding tribal sov-
ereignty without congressional support. United States v. Bryant obviously
reversed the Ninth Circuit's line of cases leading to the panel decision be-
low,291 and may contribute to a more coherent conceptualization of the
constitutional status of tribal courts. The spirit and language of these cas-
es, like the spirit and language of the Bay Mills and Lara cases discussed
287. Id. at 49:21-52:20.
288. Id. at 50:8-9.
289. Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159, 2160 (2016).
290. 597 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2010).
291. United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389
(9th Cir. 1989).
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in Section II.B, will add modem opinions in support of past affirmations
of third sovereign status. Primarily, however, the decisions maintained
the precedential status quo more than they changed it.
The success of tribes in these cases also completely correlates with
the support of the United States. The United States was the primary liti-
gant in United States v. Bryant, and contributed effective briefs and oral
argument in support of tribal interests in Dollar General and Nebraska v.
Parker.2 92 In contrast, the United States was the opposing party in Me-
nominee Tribe, the sole loss of the term. Support from the United States
is not a necessary or sufficient condition for success of tribal interests.
Fully half of tribal losses in the Roberts Court were in cases in which the
United States filed on behalf of tribal interests, 21 and one of the few wins
was Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, in which the United States was
the opposing party.2H But it is an important condition, and history proves
that the United States is an inconsistent friend to tribal nations, and very
often no friend at all.
President Trump's Indian affairs background bodes poorly for tribal
interests. President Trump has a dark history of propagating lies and ra-
cial accusations to promote his casino interests. In 2000, he was behind a
front organization that purchased newspaper advertisements and bill-
boards falsely accusing the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe of drug dealing in
order to defeat tribal efforts to build a casino in the Catskills?.29 He paid a
$250,000 fine for violating state lobbying law in connection with the cam-
paign.2" In 1993, before a congressional subcommittee on Indian gaming,
he leveled charges of organized crime against Indian casinos, claimed
tribal gaming was unfair because, unlike him, they did not pay hundreds
of millions in taxes, and claimed Connecticut tribes should not be enti-
tled to game at all because "they don't look like Indians to me." 297 Noth-
ing if not an opportunist, however, Trump later proclaimed a "love fest"
292. In Dollar General in particular, the brief of the United States was an extremely strong affir-
mation of tribal sovereignty. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Dollar Gen., 136 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 13-1496). It was likely not a coincidence that the lead author of the
brief is listed as Hilary Thompkins, Solicitor for the United States Department of the Interior, a citizen
of the Navajo Nation with a long background in federal Indian affairs.
293. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209 (2012); Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009); Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008); Wagnon v. Prairie Band
Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
294. Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 567 U.S. 182 (2012).
295. Joseph Tanfani, Trump Was Once So Involved in Trying to Block an Indian Casino That He
Secretly Approved Attack Ads, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-
trump-anti-indian-campaign-20160630-snap-story.html.
296. Id.
297. "They Don't Look Like Indians to Me': Donald Trump on Native American Casinos in 1993,
WASH. POST (July 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/they-dont-look-like-
indians-to-me-donald-trump-on-native-american-casinos-in-1993/2016/07/01/20736038-3fd4-11e6-9el6-
4cf0la4ldecb video.html.
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with other tribal casinos, drawing extortionate fees from them until they
finally severed ties.2 98
The Trump Administration, moreover, immediately undermined
important Obama-era victories for tribes, directing2 approval of ease-
ments for construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline and reconsidera-
tion of the designation of the sacred Bears Ears National Monument3
Actions and statements by several members of the administration, more-
over, suggest advocacy of something similar to the Termination Policy, in
which the federal government sought to end its special relationship with
Native tribes.3 01 The Executive Branch will likely provide little support to
tribes in the Supreme Court.
The 2015 Term also did not help build a cogent theory of third sov-
ereign status. As discussed in Part III, the failure in Bryant to directly
adopt the comity approach applied to foreign nation convictions resulted
in unnecessary distortions of both constitutional law and justice for tribal
litigants. Justice Clarence Thomas's concurrence in Bryant also highlights
the need for a constitutional theory of tribal sovereignty. Although Jus-
tice Thomas concurred in light of past precedent, he claimed there was
no "sound constitutional basis" for the three pillars of the decision: the
Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule in Burgett, the tribal sovereignty to
prosecute tribal members without constitutional restrictions, and the
plenary power that grants Congress the ability to punish crimes between
tribal members on tribal land2'0 Justice Thomas has bewailed the alleged
conflict between tribal sovereignty and federal power before. 0 3 Under-
standing the implications of third sovereign status would resolve this al-
leged conflict.
This is what third sovereign status means. First, tribes are not states
or the federal government, but are analogous to foreign nations who
must act within U.S. borders. Like foreign nations, tribes are not subject
to the United States Constitution. Like foreign nations with their own
territory (including diplomatic premises in the United States) 41 tribes
have territorial jurisdiction, extraterritorial jurisdiction on the same
298. Joseph Tanfani & Noah Bierman, Trump's Art of the Deal with Native Americans: Racial
Insults or Flattery, Whichever Was Good for Business, L.A. TIMES (June 17, 2016), http://www.latimes.
com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-american-indians-20160617-snap-story.html.
299. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No. 16-1534, 2017 WL
2573994, at *7 (D.D.C. June 14,2017).
300. Darryl Fears & Juliet Eilperin, Interior Secretary Recommends Trump Consider Scaling Back
Bears Ears National Monument, WASH. POST (June 12, 2017), httpsJ//www.washingtonpost.com/
news/energy-environment/wp/2017/06/12/interior-secretary-recommends-delaying-a-final-decision-on-
changing-bears-ears-national-monument/?utm term=.daalc2a89c6O.
301. See Indigenous Law and Policy Center, Donald Trump and Indian Country's Termination
Fears, TURTLE TALKS: INDIGENOUS L. & POL'Y CTR. BLOG, MICH. ST. U.C. OF L. (May 8, 2017),
https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2017/05/08/donald-trump-and-indian-countrys-termination-fears/.
302. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1967 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring).
303. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565; United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214 (2004) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
304. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations arts. 22-23, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95
(discussing special jurisdictional status of premises of diplomatic missions).
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grounds as other sovereigns," and federal and state jurisdiction over
their territories and citizens is limited. Nevertheless, just as it would for a
foreign nation within the United States, the federal government has vast
constitutional authority with respect to tribal nations and their citizens.",
Diplomatic concerns and respect for the sovereignty of foreign nations
limit federal intrusion on foreign sovereignty and create interpretive
rules against finding statutes to authorize such intrusion.3 " Similarly, the
federal relationship with tribal nations influences executive and congres-
sional action and creates distinctive judicial interpretive canons. This
analogy between tribes and foreign nations has substantial support in
constitutional history, " and elements of it can be found in the majority
opinions in Lara3" and Bay Mills Indian Community, 310 but work remains
to construct this understanding on the Court.
Whether this work is successful will depend, in part, on the compo-
sition of the Court. With the death of Justice Scalia, the Court has four
members, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor, who are oc-
casionally sympathetic to tribal interests, and, at least sometimes, vote in
favor of them. It has two members, Justices Alito and Thomas, who have
almost always, until 2016, voted against tribal interests, and another two,
Justice Kennedy and the Chief Justice, who broke this record only to up-
hold precedent squarely on point in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Com-
munity.311 Given this record, the eight-zero opinions in Bryant and Parker
may reflect a desire to avoid unnecessary disagreement in light of the
death of Justice Scalia more than true unanimity. A ninth Justice could
often be the deciding vote in federal Indian law questions.
Justice Neil Gorsuch, while not always sympathetic to tribal con-
cerns, will almost certainly be better for tribes than Justice Scalia was,
and possibly better than Judge Merrick Garland, President Obama's
nominee, would have been.312 As a Colorado native and longtime judge
305. Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2016).
306. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 200-03.
307. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664-65 (2013) (discussing
presumption against extraterritorial application of United States law).
308. In fact, the original and continuing description of tribes is as "domestic dependent nations."
Lara, 541 U.S. at 204-05; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831); see also Ablavsky, supra
note 82; Newton, supra note 82.
309. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (upholding the "Duro Fix," which affirmed inherent criminal jurisdiction
over Indians who were not citizens of the tribe asserting jurisdiction).
310. 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014).
311. Id.
312. Judge Garland had an extremely limited federal Indian law record, but some of it did give
rise to concern by tribal advocates. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Judge Garland's Indian Law Record,
TURTLE TALK (Mar. 16, 2016), https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2016/03/16/judge-garlands-indian-law-
record/ (discussing Judge Garland's participation in the unsigned per curiam opinion in San Manuel
Indian Bingo & Casino v. N.L.R.B., 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that tribal casinos were
subject to the National Labor Relations Act). An opinion Judge Garland authored also might suggest
ambivalence about Supreme Court precedent on the equal protection status of congressional measures
regarding Indians. U.S. Air Tour Ass'n v. F.A.A., 298 F.3d 997, 1012 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2002). With little
experience with Native peoples or federal Indian law, moreover, Judge Garland would have faced a
larger learning curve in recognizing that tribes are living governments and familiarizing himself with
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on the Tenth Circuit, Justice Gorsuch is familiar with Native issues, and
will not have as much difficulty wrapping his mind around the idea of
tribes as living governments. His record in the Tenth Circuit is also rela-
tively balanced. As set forth in a memorandum by the Native American
Rights Fund, Justice Gorsuch wrote or joined in twenty-eight opinions
on federal Indian law issues while on the Tenth Circuit.3 ' Of these, tribal
interests won sixteen, lost nine, and three were a draw. Justice Gorsuch
was both the author and the deciding vote in Hydro Resources Inc. v.
EPA, a devastating decision making new law and limiting the scope of
Indian country.314 But he also wrote stinging rejections of Utah's attempts
to limit the boundaries of the Utah Reservation despite Tenth Circuit
precedent,31 ' and wrote or joined a number of opinions deciding contest-
ed issues of tribal exhaustion and sovereign immunity in favor of tribes.31
The National Congress of American Indians and the Native American
Rights Fund even issued a joint letter of support for Justice Gorsuch,
opining that he would be "open-minded to all perspectives" on Indian
law issues." It remains to be seen whether he will maintain this open-
mindedness once he has the power to not only interpret, but overrule
past precedent.
V. CONCLUSION
Was the 2016 Term a revolution, or a blip? I believe it was some-
where in between. The cases the Court decided in favor of tribal interests
were ones in which precedent strongly supported its conclusions and the
United States argued with the tribes. A ninth Justice could tip the bal-
ance on the Court in either direction, as could an administration less
supportive of tribal self-governance. While Justice Gorsuch is not a disas-
ter for tribes, neither is he an advocate, and the Trump Administration
seems at times actively hostile to tribal sovereignty.
While the executive has significant influence, the Supreme Court is
the institution that fluctuates least with political whims, and Chief Justice
Roberts seems committed to keeping it so. Both the language of the
opinions and tenor of arguments in the Court, as well as in the dissents
Indian law precedent. As suggested in Section II.B., such learning curves often work against tribal in-
terests.
313. Memorandum from Richard Guest, Staff Attorney, Native Am. Rights Fund to Tribal Leaders &
Tribal Attorneys Nat'1 Cong. of Am. Indians - Project on the Judiciary 1 (Mar. 16, 2017), http://sct.narf.
org/articles/gorsuch-indian-law-cases.pdf.
314. 608 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2010).
315. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah Ouray Reservation v. Myton, 835 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2016);
Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah Ouray Reservation v. Utah, 790 F.3d 1000 (10th Cir. 2015).
316. See, e.g., United Planners Financial Services v. Sac and Fox Nation, 654 F. Appx 376 (10th
Cir. 2016) (holding that a non-Native corporation must exhaust tribal remedies); Bonnet v. Harvest
Holdings, Inc. 741 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that a subpoena duces tecum against a non-party
tribal entity must be quashed because of tribal sovereign immunity).
317. See, Rob Capriccioso, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed to US Supreme Court with Strong Tribal Sup-
port, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Apr. 7, 2017), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.comlnews/politics/
neil-gorsuch-confirmed-us-supreme-court-strong-tribal-supportl.
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and rare wins of recent years, do show that something is changing. More
Justices are aware of the precedents establishing tribes as a third sover-
eign within the United States."' More are also aware of the crucial im-
portance of furthering tribal self-government today, both for Native
communities and non-Natives they impact. These are key developments
with the potential to correct the imbalance of the past quarter century.
This change is due to many factors. The Tribal Supreme Court Pro-
ject has done tremendous work in translating the law and reality of tribal
sovereignty to an unfamiliar Court. Law school programs like the Oneida
Indian Nation Professorship at Harvard begin the work of translation
long before Justices, lawyers, and clerks reach the Court. Most important
is the work of tribal nations themselves in building self-governing com-
munities and ensuring that those communities protect justice and work
effectively with their own citizens, others they impact, and local, state,
and federal governments.
Clearly, more work remains to be done. Horror stories of dysfunc-
tion within a few tribal governments undermine willingness to protect the
sovereignty of the majority.319 Outrage by non-Indians at the thought of
answering to Indian governments will continue to garner sympathy with
substantial portions of the public and the Court. And despite the 200-
year history of tribes as a third sovereign, the Court has not yet fully as-
similated this history into a coherent legal theory. But 2016 shows that
progress is being made. Given the dismal quarter century that preceded
it, that is a very welcome thing.
318. Even the Supreme Court's recent decision against tribes in Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285
(2017), for example, holding that tribal employees did not share tribe's common law sovereign immun-
ity, firmly linked tribal common law immunity to that of federal and state common law immunity.
319. See Wenona T. Singel, Indian Tribes and Human Rights Accountability, 49 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 567, 569 (2012).
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Result Subject Majority Dissent
Roberts Court
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty, 134 Win. Tribal Sovereign Kagan Scalia; Tbonims with Scalia,
S.Ct. 2024 (2014) Immunity Ginsburg. and Alito
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S.Ct. Loss ICWA Alito Scalia; Sotomayor with
2552 (2013). Ginsburg, and Kagan(Scalia joined in part)
Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Loss Land into Trust Kagan Sotomayor
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S.Ct.
2199 (2012)1
Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter. 132 Win ISDA Sotomayor Roberts with Ginsburg,
SCt. 2181 (2012) Breyer, and Alito
United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, Loss Trust Responsibility Alito Sotomayor
564 U.5 162 (2011)
United States v. Tohono O'odham Loss Trust Responsibility Kennedy Ginsburg
Nation, 563 U.S.307 (2011)
United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. Loss Trust Responsibility Scalia
2V (2009)
Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs. 556 Loss Native Hawaiian Land Alito
U.S. 163 (2009)
Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (209) Loss Land into Trust Thomas Souter with Ginsburg(concurring in part and
dissenting it part); Stevens
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Loss Tribal Jurisdiction Roberts Ginsburg with Souter,
Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008) Stevens, and Breyer
Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Loss State Jurisdiction Thomas Ginsburg with Kennedy
Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005)
Rehnquist Court Loss
Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New Loss Indian Country Ginsburg Stevens
York, 544 U.S. 197 (2005)
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Leavitt, Win ISDA Breyer
543 U.S. 631 (2005)
United States v. Lars, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) Win Tribal Jurisdiction Breyer Souter with Scalia
Inyo Cty, Ca. a. Paiute-Shoshone Indians Loss 42 U.S. 1983 Ginsburg
of the Bishop Cmty, 538 U.S. 701 (2003)
United States v. Navajo Nation,537 US. Loss Trust Responsibility Ginsburg Souter with Stevens and
488 (2003) O'Connor
United States v. White Mountain Apache Win Trust Responsibility Souter Thomas with Rehnquist,
Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003) Scalia. and Kennedy
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 Loss Federal Taxation Breyer O'Connor with Souter
U.S. 84 (2001) . 1 J
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Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) Loss Tribal Jurisdiction Scalia
Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 Win Tribal Property Souter Rehnquist with Scalia,
(2001) Thomas, and Kennedy
Atkinson Trading Co., Ine. v. Shirley, 532 Ions Tribal Jurisdiction Rehnquist
U.S. 645 (2001)
C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Loss Tribal Sovereign Ginsburg
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, Immunity
532 U.S. 411 (2001)
Dep't of Jnterior v. Klamath Water Users Ls FOIA Souter
Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1 (2001)
Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392 (2000) Win Water Ginsburg Rehnquist with OCoanor
and Thomas
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 ULS. 495 (2000) Loss Voting RightsfEqual Kennedy Ginsburg; Stevens with
Protection Ginsburg
Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. UteTribe, 526 Loss Tribal Property Kennedy Ginsburg
U.S. 865 (199q)
El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsasic, 526 Loss TribalJurisdiction Souter
U.S. 473 (1999)
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Win State Jurisdiction O'Connor Rehnquist withScalia,
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) Kennedy, and Thomas;
Thomas
Arizona Dep't of Revenue v. Blaze ConsL Loss State Jurisdiction Thomas
Co., Inc.. 526 US. 32 (1999)
Cass Cty, Minn. v. Leech Lake Band of Loss State Jurisdiction Thomas
Chippewa Indians. 524 U.S. 103 (1998)
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Techs., Win Tribal Sovereign Kennedy Stevens with Thomas and
Inc., 523 U.S 751 (1998) Immunity Ginsburg
Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians. 523 Loss State Jurisdiction Ginsburg Soauter with O'Connor
U.S. 696 (1998)
Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetic Tribal Loss Indian Country Thomas
Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998)
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, Loss Indian Country O'Connor
522 U.S. 329 (1998)
Idaho v. Coueur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho, Loss Tribal Property /State Kennedy Souter with Stevens,
521 U.S. 261 (1997) Sovereign Immunity Ginsburg, and Breyer
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 T.S. 438 Loss Tribal Jurisdiction Ginsburg(1997)
Babbitt v. Youpec. 519 U.S. 234 (1997) Loss Takings Ginsburg Stevens
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 Loss State Sovereign Rehnquist Stevens: Souter with
U.S. 44 (1996) Immunity/IGRA Ginsburg and Breyer
Oklahoma Tax Com'n v. Chickasaw Win/Loss State Jurisdiction Ginsburg Breyer with O'Connor,
Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995) Souter, and Stevens
(concurring in win,
Dep't of Taxation and Fin. of New York . Loss State Jurisdiction Stevens
v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 U.S.
61 (1994)
IHugen v.U ltah, 510 U.S. 399(1994) Loss Indian Country O'Connor Blackmun with Souter
South Dakota v. Bourland. 508 U.S. 679 Loss Tribal Jurisdiction Thomas Blackmnawith Soutcr
(1993)
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993) Loss GovernotenLServices Souter
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Win State Jurisdiction O'Connor
Nation, 508 U.S.1.14 (1993)
Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1,993) Loss State Jurisdiction Rehnquist
County of Yakima, Wash. v. Loss State Jurisdiction Scalia
Confederated Tribes and Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251
(1992)
Blatchford v. Native ViL of Noatak,,501 Loss State Sovereign Scalia Blackman with Marshall
U.S. 775 (199.1) Immunity and Steven
Oklahoma Tax Coniwn v. Citizen Band Win State Jurisdictionflribal Rehnquist
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, Sovereign Immunity
498 U.S. 505 (19911
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1.990) Loss Tribal Jurisdiction Kennedy Brennan with Marshall
Total: 49, Wins: 11.5 (23.5%), Losses: 37.5 (76.5%)
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